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“In questions of power, then, let no more be said of confidence in man,
but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.”
—Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolution of 1798 1

INTRODUCTION
About a year and a half before the tenth anniversary of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States Supreme Court was
primed to hear oral arguments in a case concerning seventeen detainees
who had been held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base since 2002. The
case, known in its various iterations as Kiyemba v. Obama, 2 presented the
Court with an opportunity to vindicate the purposes of the writ of habeas
corpus by finally and firmly establishing the remedy attached to the right of
habeas corpus, a right guaranteed to Guantanamo Bay detainees in the
3
landmark 2008 case of Boumediene v. Bush. Instead, after the government
had advised the Court of post-certiorari developments at the proverbial
4
eleventh hour, the Court subsequently vacated the appeal from a District
of Columbia Court of Appeals’ judgment, a decision which found that
federal courts lacked the power to release detainees into the continental
United States even when other release options were not available, and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of “[t]his change in the
5
underlying facts.” The dismissal of the previously granted cert. petition
amounted to a statement to this effect: Why should the Court get involved
at this point? Why indeed. The question presented to the Court is a
legal—not factual—one that goes to the heart of the separation of powers
problem that the lower court created. The Court’s dismissal in a per curiam
opinion without objection from any of the justices and over the strong
6
objections of the detainees’ lawyers renders the D.C. Circuit’s opinion,
reinstated on remand, the final word on the remedy to which habeas
petitioners are entitled. That no justice objected to the dismissal gives the
appearance of a unified court, and adds strength to the reinstated opinion of

1. Thomas Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolution of 1798 (1798), reprinted in Scott Horton,
Jefferson – The Risk of too Much Confidence in Elected Officials, HARPER’S MAGAZINE (July 4, 2009),
http://harpers.org/blog/2009/07/jefferson-the-risk-of-too-much-confidence-in-elected-government/.
2. Kiyemba I, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009) (cert. granted).
3. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
4. See Letter from Elena Kagan, then-U.S. Solicitor General, to William K. Suter, Clerk of the
Supreme Court of the United Sates (Feb. 19, 2010) available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/02/SG-Kiyemba-letter-2-19-10.pdf (describing the relocation offers made)
[hereinafter Feb. 19, 2010 Kagan Letter; see also Letter from Sabin Willett, Detainee Counsel in the
Kiyemba v. Obama Litigation, to William K. Suter, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States
(Feb.
19,
2010)
at
4
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10
_08_1234_PetitionersLetterBrief.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Feb. 19, 2010 Willett Letter].
5. Kiyemba I, 559 U.S. 131, (2010) (subsequent dismissal and remand).
6. See Feb. 19, 2010 Willett Letter, supra note 4, at 2 (arguing that “[r]eview of that
constitutionally intolerable decision remains as necessary today as when certiorari was granted”).
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the lower court, despite its misguided reliance on a doctrine that allows the
7
political branches’ policy choices to reign supreme.
This Article considers the ramifications of the Kiyemba litigation,
focusing particularly on what the case means to our understanding of the
rule of law more than ten years after September 11. This Article makes
three primary arguments: First, although the Supreme Court provided
Guantanamo Bay detainees access to U.S. courts through the writ of habeas
corpus, it has failed to provide a meaningful remedy for habeas petitioners,
despite ample constitutional and doctrinal authority for doing so. This
rights-remedy gap is problematic from a rule of law standpoint, and the gap
8
is well illustrated by the Kiyemba litigation. Second, the Court’s failure to
consider the merits of the case, thus allowing a problematic lower court
opinion to stand, has perpetuated confusion in a doctrinal area of
constitutional, political, and rhetorical significance. A dissent to the per
curiam dismissal would, at the very least, have served the significant
purpose of articulating core constitutional values. Finally, the D.C.
Circuit’s application of immigration law to the habeas remedy question in
9
its reinstated opinion in Kiyemba v. Obama effectively trumps the
detainees’ constitutional right to obtain release by substituting immigration
law’s doctrinally exceptional deference to the Executive for what long has
been understood as the core function of habeas corpus: undoing illegal
detention by the Executive.
The now-controlling D.C. Circuit opinion offers one viewpoint:
habeas relief, when it involves release into the continental United States, is
an immigration matter where, by virtue of the branch’s plenary power, the
Executive’s decisions govern. The courts, in the D.C. Circuit’s view, have
7. See Joshua A. Geltzer, Decisions Detained: The Courts’ Embrace of Complexity in
Guantanamo-Related Litigation, 29 BERK.J. INT’L L. 94, 111 (2011) (“Having granted certiorari, the
Supreme Court was expected to have the final say, but ended up vacating the circuit court’s opinion,
then seeing it reinstated by the D.C. Circuit.”); Laura J. Arandes, Note, Life Without Parole: An
Immigration Framework Applies to Potentially Indefinite Detention at Guantanamo Bay, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1046, 1051 & n.32 (2011) (“While the facts undergirding the Uighurs’ original petition for release
have changed, the Kiyemba decision remains good law.”).
8. Caroline W. Stanton, Rights and Remedies: Meaningful Habeas Corpus in Guantanamo, 23
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 891, 898 (2010) (“[H]istorically[,] habeas remedies were limited to
unconditional release. . . . [T]he power to grant the writ has always meant the power to grant the release
[of the unlawfully detained].”) see also Caprice L. Roberts, Rights, Remedies, and Habeas Corpus—
The Uighurs, Legally Free While Actually Imprisoned, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 5 (2009) (“The nature,
scope, and enforcement of remedies shape substantive rights. One of the law’s most fundamental
maxims is that for every wrong, there must be a remedy.”) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23, 109). But see Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022, 1027 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (“Not every violation of a right yields a remedy, even when the right is constitutional.
Application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to defeat a remedy is one common example.
Another example, closer to this case, is application of the political question doctrine [to defeat a
remedy].”).
9. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reinstating and modifying to take into account
new developments in a per curiam opinion in Kiyemba III cited at 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(Rogers, J., concurring)).
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no part to play because immigration issues fall squarely within the
Executive’s sovereign prerogative. This approach, I believe, sanctions
whatever political remedy the Executive may select—here, diplomatically
negotiated resettlement outside of the United States—as a substitute for the
legal remedy of release. The D.C. Circuit’s view cannot be correct, I
argue, because it would mean that, although a court may find that a
10
detainee’s imprisonment is unlawful, that court might be powerless to
remedy the unlawful imprisonment. Thus, I offer a view contrary to the
D.C. Circuit: in order to accord complete habeas relief particularly where,
as here, relocation efforts remain long-ongoing, a habeas court must have
the authority to admit foreign nationals into the interior of the United States
as a remedy for their unlawful detention. Historically, “the writ of habeas
corpus was conceived and used as a control against the unlawful use of
11
executive power.” And traditionally, custody of the body transfers to the
court in habeas proceedings so that the court may order “the immediate and
12
non-discretionary release of an illegally detained person.” Such authority
ensures that the courts of this country are able to act in a way that restores
the rule of law, so deeply damaged in the months and years following
September 11.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I provide the factual and
procedural history of the Kiyemba litigation. In Part II, I consider
Kiyemba’s context, looking to historical perspectives on the role of courts
in wartime, the Supreme Court’s post-September 11 jurisprudence, and the
development of “national security fundamentalism” in the D.C. Circuit
after September 11. In so doing, I discuss how, in the months and years
following September 11, the Executive asserted inherent power that
rendered it nearly unreviewable and that, through the acquiescence of some
courts, significantly undermined the rule of law. In Part III, I reconsider
Kiyemba, highlighting the illegality of indefinite detention and the right to
a corresponding remedy. Contrary to the position taken by the D.C.
Circuit, the rights-remedy gap is not an unreviewable facet of the
Executive’s plenary power over immigration. Instead, it is a practical and
necessary reality to be handled by the federal courts. The judiciary’s
failure to assert its constitutional role in this area, I argue, may be the result
10. The first court to review the Uighurs’ petition found their detention unlawful. See In re
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]his court rules that the
government’s continued detention of the petitioners is unlawful.”). The D.C. Circuit, while reversing
the district court’s release order, did not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the Uighurs’
ongoing detention was unlawful.
11. Brief for Petitioner at 45-46, Kiyemba I, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009) available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10
_00_1234_PetitionerAmCuUKParliament.authcheckdam.pdf; [hereinafter Lord Goldsmith Brief]; see
also In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
12. Lord Goldsmith Brief, supra note 11, at 46 (observing that “[i]t would be a surprising result
that would run counter to this history if the exercise of executive powers—in this instance immigration
powers—was allowed to thwart the operation of the writ”).

VAUGHNS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

8/12/2013 1:16 PM

OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS

11

of judicial abstention caused by political and practical influences on the
Court.
I staunchly believe that the habeas right is accompanied by a release
remedy. Where there is no threat to the public safety, and where other
release options are not available, that remedy must be release into the
United States. And above all, I believe that this case is not an immigration
13
matter subject to the prerogatives of the political branches. However,
accepting that the practical and political influences described above may
continue to prevent courts from awarding such relief, there is nonetheless a
need for recognition of the damage that the political remedy of indefinite
detention inflicts on the rule of law. Thus, in Part IV, I make a case for the
value of an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s per curiam
dismissal in Kiyemba I—a reminder, however small, but unquestionably
important, that the rule of law remains.
I.

KIYEMBA V. OBAMA: FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The legal saga of the seventeen detainees involved in the Kiyemba
litigation begins, and someday (one hopes) will end, with relocation into
the interior of U.S. territory. Sometime early in 2001, a number of
Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim minority group from the Xinxiang province in
China, which long has been subjected to oppression and torture, fled China
for the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan, where they settled into
14
camps. After September 11, 2001, American aerial strikes destroyed the
15
Uighurs’ Tora Bora camp. Fleeing their destroyed camp, the unarmed
16
Uighurs crossed into Pakistan, where they were taken in by local villagers
17
and provided with food and shelter. In December 2001, the Uighurs were
arrested by the Pakistani government and, for a sizeable bounty, transferred
18
to U.S. custody. In June 2002, the Uighurs were transferred to the naval
base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where they remained imprisoned for more

13. For example, Congress added a rider to a defense funding bill, the Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1859 to bar use of defense funding to release
in the continental U.S. anyone detained at Guantanamo on the date of the bill’s enactment. This rider
was a political response to the Executive’s plan to resettle some of the Kiyemba I petitioners in
Virginia. See Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Plans to Accept Several Chinese Muslims From Guantanamo, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/24/nation/na-gitmo-release24. As noted in
the Kiyemba I petition for writ of certiorari, “[r]esponding to highly-charged political opposition to this
plan, the President shelved it.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, No. 10-775 Kiyemba v. Obama, (Dec. 8,
2010),
at
7
(footnote
omitted)
available
at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/12/2010-12-08-Kiyemba-III-petition.pdf.
14. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022, 1023–24 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 837
(D.D.C. 2008).
15. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1024; Parhat, 532 F.3d at 837.
16. See Parhat, 532 F.3d at 837.
17. Id.
18. See id.; In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2008).
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than five years.
In 2004, the Department of Defense held Combatant Status Review
20
The tribunals determined that the Uighurs
Tribunals for the Uighurs.
were enemy combatants based on a theory that the detained Uighurs had
been involved with the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which
the State Department had designated a terrorist organization three years
21
after they entered U.S. custody; that the ETIM was associated with Al
Qaeda and the Taliban; and that the ETIM had engaged in hostilities
against the United States, the Defense Department classified them as
22
23
In Parhat v. Gates, the D.C. District Court,
enemy combatants.
considering the Uighurs’ challenge to their designation, ruled that the
government presented insufficient evidence to warrant designating the
Uighurs as enemy combatants. Following the Parhat decision, the
government formally retracted, and never again argued in support of, the
24
Uighurs’ classification as enemy combatants.
A. The Case in the Lower Courts
The Uighurs began filing petitions for habeas corpus in 2005, but due
to various congressional enactments and Supreme Court cases, review of
the Uighurs’ petitions did not begin until 2008. In In re Guantanamo Bay
Detainee Litigation, which later became known as Kiyemba I throughout
the appellate and certiorari process, the District Court for the District of
Columbia considered the Uighurs’ petitions for the first time, concluding
that “the Constitution prohibits indefinite detention without just cause,” and
that, as a result, the government’s continued detention of the non-enemy
25
combatant Uighurs was unlawful. Having found the Uighurs’ detention
26
unlawful, the trial court ordered the Uighurs’ release. However, the court
struggled to find a relocation site for the Uighurs upon release. The
Uighurs objected to release in China, their native country, citing fear of
27
arrest, torture, or execution. Subsequent efforts by the Executive to find
an alternative relocation site for the Uighurs proved unsuccessful, as no
other third-party countries were willing to accept the Uighurs, perhaps due
to political pressure from the Chinese government or due to the Executive’s
19. See Parhat, 532 F.3d at 837.
20. See id. at 838.
21. Samuel Chow, Note, The Kiyemba Paradox: Creating a Judicial Framework to Eradicate
Indefinite, Unlawful Executive Detentions, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 775, 793 n.126 (2011).
22. Parhat, 532 F.3d at 838.
23. Id. at 834.
24. See Chow, supra note 21, at 793 (citing Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2009). It
has been reported that the government knew as early as 2003 that the Uighurs’ detainment was in error.
See CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, OUR PAGES, http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/currentcases/Kiyemba-v.-bush.
25. In re Guantanamo Bay Litigation, 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34, 38–39 (D.D.C. 2008).
26. Id. at 34.
27. See Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1024.
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original determination that the Uighurs were worthy of the enemy
28
combatant designation. In their petitions for habeas corpus, the Uighurs
sought release into the continental United States, as no other options were
29
available to them at that time.
Considering the release issue, the D.C. District Court acknowledged
that the authority to admit aliens has typically been a political inquiry, but
30
noted that these powers are not absolute. However, in the court’s view,
the Uighurs’ case presented “exceptional” circumstances: The government
captured the Uighurs and “transported them to a detention facility where
31
they will remain indefinitely.” The government had not charged them
with a crime, and it “presented no reliable evidence that they would pose a
32
Moreover, the district court explained, the
threat to U.S. interests.”
government “stymied its own efforts to resettle” the Uighurs “by
insisting . . . that they were enemy combatants, the same designation given
33
to terrorists willing to detonate themselves amongst crowds of civilians.”
Because habeas corpus is an “indispensable mechanism for monitoring the
separation of powers,” the court found that the government’s so-called
“best efforts” to attempt to resettle the Uighurs did not substantively
34
change the nature of their claims. Instead, according to the district court,
the government’s unsuccessful efforts to relocate the Uighurs over a period
of five years suggested that the Uighurs’ detention had “crossed the
35
Stating that “our system of
constitutional threshold into infinitum.”
checks and balances is designed to preserve the fundamental right of
liberty,” the court granted the Uighurs’ request for release into the United
36
States. The government immediately appealed the district court’s ruling.
Considering the case on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia began by analyzing “several firmly established
37
propositions.” The court first noted the “ancient principle” that a state
has the absolute right to exclude or admit aliens and “to prescribe
38
applicable terms and conditions for their exclusion or admission.” Since
39
the Chinese Exclusion Case, the court explained, the Supreme Court had,
“without exception, sustained the exclusive power of the political branches
to decide” whether an alien may enter the United States and what the terms

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See id.; see Chow, supra note 21, at 794–95.
Chow, supra note 21, at 794.
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig. 581 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Id.
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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40

for their entry may be based on the so-called plenary power doctrine.
Accordingly, no court has the authority, unless explicitly provided by law,
41
Because the
to review a political branch determination of exclusion.
Executive determined that the Uighurs should not be permitted entry into
the United States, the Court of Appeals found no authority for the district
42
court to set aside that determination. Furthermore, the court stated its
uncertainty about whether the Uighurs “would [even] qualify for entry or
43
admission under the immigration laws.” As a result, it was not convinced
44
that their entry into the United States was compelled by law. The mere
fact that the Uighurs were found not to be enemy combatants did not, the
45
court stated, qualify them for admission into the United States. In light of
these considerations, and based on the fact that no law expressly authorized
the court to release the Uighurs into the United States, the Court of Appeals
reversed the district court’s release order and remanded for further
46
proceedings consistent with their opinion.
B. The Supreme Court Grants Certiorari Review
In October 2009, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Kiyemba I to decide whether a federal court, employing its habeas
jurisdiction under Boumediene v. Bush, has the power to order the release
of individuals detained by the executive for seven years, “where the
detention is indefinite and without authorization in law, and release into the
47
Between
continental United States is the only possible remedy.”
February 3 and February 5, 2010, the parties submitted letters informing
the Court that the Swiss government had agreed to accept two of the
48
The other five petitioners were previously offered
Uighur petitioners.
resettlement by two countries—Palau and “another nation” according to the
government—although the detainees rejected those offers for a variety of
49
According to then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan, these
reasons.
developments eliminated the core factual premise of the case—namely, that

40. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1025.
41. Id. at 1026 (citing United States v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).
42. See id.
43. Id. at 1029.
44. See id. For a discussion of the Court of Appeals’ views on whether immigration law might
provide a valid basis for detention, including the application of refugee, asylum, and parole law, see id.
at 1029−31.
45. See id. at 1029.
46. Id. at 1032.
47. Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 458, 559 (2009); Petition for Certiorari, No. 08-1234,
Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 458 (Apr. 3, 2009).
48. See Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Orders New Briefing in Uighur Case, BLOG OF LEGAL
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2010, 11:49 AM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/02/supreme-court-ordersnew-briefing-in-uighur-case.html.
49. Id.; see also Feb. 19, 2010 Kagan Letter, supra note 4 (describing the relocation offers
made).
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50

release into the United States was the only available remedy. In light of
these developments, Kagan argued, the Uighurs’ continuing presence at
51
On February 12, 2010, the
Guantanamo was completely “voluntary.”
Supreme Court requested that the parties file letter briefs with the Court
addressing “the effect, if any, of the developments discussed in the letters
52
submitted by the parties on February 3 and February 5.”
On March 1, 2010, the Supreme Court rendered its per curiam opinion
53
in Kiyemba I. According to the Court, the change in the underlying facts
raised by the February letters “may affect the legal issues presented” to the
54
Court. No lower court had yet ruled “in light of the new facts,” and the
Supreme Court refused to be the first court to rule on these new factual
55
Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Court of
issues.
Appeals and remanded the case with instructions that the lower court
determine “in the first instance, what further proceedings in that court or in
the District Court are necessary and appropriate for the full and prompt
56
disposition of the case in light of the new developments.” Without saying
so explicitly, the Court’s per curiam opinion amounted to a determination
that the new facts rendered the case moot.
57
On remand, in what came to be called Kiyemba III, the D.C. Court of
Appeals reinstated its judgment and opinion in Kiyemba I, modified to
58
account for the recent developments in relocating the Uighurs. Shortly
thereafter, the Supreme Court denied the Uighurs’ renewed petition for
59
certiorari. Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor issued a
brief statement addressing the denial. In their view, the government’s
resettlement offers, “the lack of any meaningful challenge [by the Uighurs]
as to their appropriateness, and the Government’s uncontested commitment
to continue to work to resettle [the Uighurs] transform [the habeas]
60
Put differently, there is, the justices stated, “no Governmentclaim.”
imposed obstacle to petitioners’ timely release and appropriate
61
resettlement.” If circumstances were to materially change, the justices

50. See Feb. 19, 2010 Kagan Letter, supra note 4.
51. Linda Greenhouse, Saved by the Swiss, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2010),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/saved-by-the-swiss/ (describing Kagan’s arguments).
52. Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1498 (No. 08-1234) (2010).
53. Kiyemba v. Obama, 559 U.S. 131, (2010) (subsequent dismissal and remand).
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005)).
56. Id.
57. As for Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010), it
relates only tangentially to Kiyemba I and III. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Normalizing Guantanamo, 48
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1547, 1558-62 (2011) (explaining that Kiyemba II involves similar issues raised
when the military detention of terrorism suspects is concerned).
58. Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
59. Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011).
60. Id. at 1631.
61. Id.
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stated that the Uighurs should “raise their original issue (or related issues)
62
again in the lower courts and this Court.”
Thus, for now, and for at least some of the Uighur detainees, their
story did indeed finally end, as it began, in relocation—albeit in relocation
to a foreign country. For others, relocation remains little more than a hope.
Regardless, at the time that the Supreme Court was presented with the
petitions in Kiyemba I and Kiyemba III, the Uighurs were still being—and
had been, for over six years—unlawfully detained by the U.S. government.
New factual issues related to continuing diplomatic negotiations for
transfer to another country should not have altered the legal requirement to
release them, at the very least pending successful completion of the
negotiations for their release. While the majority of the Uighurs originally
brought to Guantanamo Bay in 2002 have since been relocated, several
remain, effectively indefinitely detained, by virtue of their simple desire to
select, or at least have a say in, the place where they will live—a right that
rule of law principles suggests they are entitled, having had their detention
determined unlawful.
Petitioners’ reasons for rejecting available relocation offers are varied,
but not without cause. For example, Bahtiyar Mahnut refused to accept
Palau’s offer of relocation because that country refused to accept his
brother, Arkin Mahmud, who had developed severe mental health problems
at Guantanamo after spending considerable time in solitary confinement,
63
due to its purported inability to treat those problems within its borders.
And as noted in petitioners’ letter brief to the Court, “[t]he consequences of
solitary confinement are psychologically brutal,” and therefore likely to
64
require significant treatment options. Other detainees rejected relocation
offers because the proposed locations were not home to an established
65
Uighur community. The group of Uighurs relocated to Albania shortly
before the Supreme Court oral argument in the Kiyemba case, illustrate the
problems that may arise from relocation to foreign lands. The Uighurs now
living in Albania live in a refugee camp, monitored by armed guards, and
66
surrounded by razor wire. There is no established Uighur community in
Albania, and the Uighurs do not speak the language, making social
67
integration difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, relocated Uighurs have

62. Id. at 1632.
63. See Del Quentin Wilber, Uighur’s Chance to Leave Guantanamo Means Leaving Brother,
POST,
(Sept.
28,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpWASH.
dyn/content/article/2009/09/27/AR2009092703076.html?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2009092703279.
64. Feb. 19, 2010 Willet Letter, supra note 4, at 2 (citing to the Court’s observation of this
condition in In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890)).
65. See Chinese Muslims at Guantanamo Bay Still Need Help Resettling, FT. WAYNE J.
GAZETTE, Mar. 8, 2010, at 11A.
66. Kara Simard, Note, Innocent at Guantanamo Bay: Granting Political Asylum to Unlawfully
Detained Uighur Muslims, 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 365, 386 (2007).
67. See id.
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often reported social and community alienation due to their political status,
and the assumption that either their original designation as “enemy
combatants” or their time spent at Guantanamo means that they are violent
or dangerous.
Apparently in the eyes of the Court, however, the Uighurs are “too
picky” in their relocation wishes, refusing perfectly good resettlement
68
This undoubtedly is a problematic position. The government
offers.
wasn’t “very discriminating when [it] scooped them up in Afghanistan, and
69
carried them away,” ultimately detaining the Uighurs for nearly a decade.
As one commentator has noted, “[i]s the idea that as long as they aren’t
being tortured they should be pleased to find themselves wherever we
70
might put them next? How about a research station in Antarctica?” I
believe that habeas relief must be accompanied by a meaningful remedy, in
this case, physical freedom, without the restrictions associated with life,
albeit in the “least restrictive conditions” available, at the Guantanamo Bay
naval base. It also must be accompanied by other rights that the detainees
long have been denied, including the right to have some say in the ultimate
location where they will live. The Uighurs’ detention has been found to be
unlawful; their designation as “enemy combatants” was declared
unjustified. They must be relocated from the site of their detention. Surely
we cannot blame them for wanting some choice in where they end up. At
the very least, pending permanent relocation to an “appropriate country,”
mutually selected, the Uighurs could be resettled in an established Uighur
71
community in the United States.
Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Kiyemba III, the D.C.
Circuit’s Kiyemba I decision, reinstated as modified, still stands. As
commentators have noted, the Supreme Court’s last act—or rather, its
failure to act—allows its landmark 2008 decision in Boumediene to unravel
72
Without a meaningful remedy,
to the point of its near-evisceration.
73
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit’s governing
habeas relief means little.
opinion does not account for the potentially unending nature of the War on
74
Terror, and incorrectly relies on immigration law as a basis for denying

68. See Amy Davidson, The Uighurs’ Passover Story, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 19, 2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2011/04/uighurs-supreme-court-guantanamopassover.html).
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See Amended Brief for Uyghur American Association as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 16, Kiyemba v. Bush, (No. 08-5424) (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 2008), available at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Uyghur%20American%20Association%20-%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf.
72. See, e.g., Chow, supra note 21, at 777; Jennifer L. Milko, Comment, Separation of Powers
and Guantanamo Detainees: Defining the Proper Roles of the Executive and Judiciary in Habeas Cases
and the Need for Supreme Guidance, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 173, 195 (2012).
73. See infra Part II.A.
74. See infra Part I.A.2.
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release to the Uighur detainees. In Hamdi, the Supreme Court stated that
it had “no reason to doubt that [lower] courts faced with . . . sensitive
matters,” like those raised in Kiyemba and the other detainee cases, “will
pay proper heed both to the matters of national security that might arise in
an individual case and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding
76
essential liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns.”
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Kiyemba I, reinstated in Kiyemba III,
suggests that the Court’s faith was misguided. Rather than balancing the
competing interests of national security and individual rights, the court
incorrectly employing immigration law’s plenary power doctrine deferred
entirely to the decision-making of the executive branch. It is now time—
77
however unlikely—for the Supreme Court to “finish what it started” more
than four years ago in Boumediene, and definitively rule on the proper
remedy to be fashioned by habeas courts in cases related to Guantanamo
Bay.
II.

PLACING KIYEMBA IN CONTEXT: DETERIORATION OF THE RULE
OF LAW POST-9/11

On September 11, 2001, a group of individuals associated with the AlQaeda terrorist organization executed a coordinated strike against the
United States, resulting in the deaths of 3,000 innocent civilians, the
“largest single day death toll from foreign attack on American soil.”78
Within days of the attacks, the legislative and executive branches began
responding with measures designed to prevent future terrorist attacks
79
against the United States. As challenges were made to these measures,
the federal courts became involved in an “ongoing dialogue” with the
80
political branches of government —a dialogue that has played out over the
course of the last ten years. At the very heart of this dialogue are questions
about the proper role of the federal courts in wartime.
These questions are not new. Indeed, in a variety of cases, stretching
81
from the Civil War to the so-called “War on Terror,” courts have
75. See infra Part I.B.
76. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (plurality opinion).
77. Milko, supra note 72, at 197.
78. Saxby Chambliss, The Future of Detainees in the Global War on Terror: A U.S. Policy
Perspective, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 821, 821 (2009) (quoting Bob Herbert, Vital Statistics, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2002, at A27).
79. See, e.g., Katy R. Jackman, Comment, Preserving the Writ: The Military Commission Act’s
Unconstitutional Attempt to Deprive Lawful Resident Aliens of Their Habeas Corpus Rights, 67 MD. L.
REV. 736, 736 (2008).
80. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long
War, the Federal Courts, and the Necessity/Legality Paradox, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 893, 910 (2009)
(reviewing BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF
TERROR (2008)).
81. See also Tom Shields, I Can’t Believe It’s Not War. . .How They Rebranded a Fiasco,
SUNDAY HERALD, July 31, 2005, at 20 (noting that the Bush administration “phase[d] out the phrase
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struggled to negotiate the delicate balance between national security and
civil liberties in times of crisis. At times, the courts have strongly asserted
their role as protectors of individual rights, and at others, they have failed
to live up to their constitutional mandate. These cases are important for
three reasons. First, they provide a way of understanding the predicament
presented by cases such as Kiyemba v. Obama, illustrating lessons learned
82
(or yet to be learned) from our past and explaining how we got here.
Second, they encourage us to think about the role of the courts as
guarantors of individual liberty, which is pertinent for our purposes
because, to the extent that courts are able to fashion meaningful habeas
remedies, a significant individual right is protected. Third, they offer a lens
for evaluating a claim made by distinguished legal historian Mary Dudziak:
That wartime is not the exception to the norm in American history, but the
83
norm itself. If Dudziak is right, how should we understand what have
been commonly called the “wartime cases,” and what is their lingering
significance today, particularly in the context of the War on Terror, which
numerous courts and commentators have defined as a potentially perpetual
84
war?
A

Historical Perspective

Essential to placing Kiyemba I in its larger context is an understanding
of how the courts have approached their role in times of war. Kiyemba I
presented to the Supreme Court an important question: What power does a
habeas court have to issue a meaningful remedy? At its core, Kiyemba I
presents even simpler questions: What role should the courts play in the
ongoing, potentially permanent, War on Terror, and what power do they
have to remedy violations of individual rights made therein?
As many have noted, the post 9-11 landscape is not the first context in
which a debate over the role of courts in times of national crisis has
85
arisen. Indeed, since the founding of this nation, jurists, lawmakers, and
‘war against terror’” and “rebranded, or repositioned to use more nuanced language” the war as “‘the
struggle against violent extremism’”); Alex Beam, Obama’s Newspeak, BOS. GLOBE, July 10, 2009, at
42 (noting that the Obama administration later rebranded the ongoing conflict as the “overseas
contingency operation”).
82. For an interesting discussion of the legal significance of these kinds of “lessons from
history,” focusing particularly on the precedential value of cases such as Ex Parte Quirin, Hirota, and
Eisentrager, see Harlan Grant Cohen, “Undead” Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis and the Lessons of
History, 84 TUL. L. REV. 957 (2010).
83. Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War, and the History of Time, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1669, 1670–71
(2010).
84. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (“[I]f measured from September 11, 2001, to the
present, [the War on Terror] is already among the longest wars in American history.”); Janelle Allen,
Comment, Assessing the First Amendment as a Defense for Wikileaks and Other Publishers of
Previously Undisclosed Government Information, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 783, 788 (2012) (describing the
War on Terror as “seemingly perpetual”).
85. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, A Culture of Civil Liberties, 36 RUTGERS L. J., 825, 825 (2005);
Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 455, 459−60 (2003).
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scholars have debated both the extent to which courts should intervene in
conflicts between national security and individual rights, and the balance
that should be struck between those competing interests. This area has
86
been well hashed in the legal and historical literature, but a few
significant case law examples are worth noting.
In April 1861, one month after his inauguration, President Abraham
Lincoln, motivated by a period of riots, bridge-burning, and “deep
uneasiness” in the Baltimore-Washington area, authorized the suspension
87
One month later, Union soldiers
of the writ of habeas corpus.
apprehended John Merryman, a vocal opponent of President Lincoln,
88
Upon his arrest, Merryman
accusing him of various acts of treason.
89
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. Chief Justice Roger Taney, riding
90
circuit in Maryland at the time, granted Merryman’s petition. Relying on
President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, the detaining officer
91
refused to comply with the writ. Upon learning of the refusal to comply,
Chief Justice Taney issued an oral statement from the bench, and several
92
days later, produced a written opinion—Ex Parte Merryman.
93
Admonishing President Lincoln, Taney held that only Congress, and not
94
the President acting alone, could suspend the writ. President Lincoln’s
response was public. In his July 4 address to a special session of Congress,
he made a now-famous statement:
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed, were
being resisted, and failing of execution, in nearly one-third of the States.
Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been
perfectly clear, that by the use of the means necessary to their execution,
some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen’s liberty,
that practically, it relieves more of the guilty, than of the innocent, should,
to a very limited extent, be violated? To state the question more directly,
are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to

86. See generally, e.g., DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE
LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998); Bruce Ackerman, Symposium: A New
Constitutional Order?, Keynote Address, Terrorism and the Constitutional Order, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
475 (2006); Frank J. Williams, Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties—Then and Now: Old Wine in New
Bottles, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 533 (2010); Wood, supra note 85.
87. REHNQUIST, supra note 86, at 22–25.
88. See generally Williams, supra note 86, at 533541 (describing the events surrounding
Merryman’s arrest).
89. See id.
90. See id. at 541–42.
91. See id.
92. 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861). Ex Parte Merryman was technically issued as an opinion of the
Circuit Court for the District of Maryland. Williams, supra note 88, at 542. In his original opinion,
however, Chief Justice Taney captioned the case “Before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States at Chambers.” Id. For more on the precedential value of Merryman, see id. at 542−43.
93. Merryman, 16 F. Cas. at 153.
94. Id. at 148.
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95

The Lincoln-Taney show-down is an early example of the potential
for conflict between the political and judicial branches in times of national
crisis. In Merryman, Taney staunchly asserted the courts’ role in protecting
96
civil liberties in wartime, habeas corpus chief among them. As his July 4
address made clear, for Lincoln, the habeas question was “a matter of
97
national survival.” Although the Lincoln administration largely ignored
Taney’s order, and although Congress later formally suspended habeas
98
corpus, what matters most—as I develop below—was that a court, or at
the very least, an individual justice, stood up for basic constitutional
principles and the rule of law, even in the face of an incredible national
crisis and the potential dissolution of the nation.
More than eighty years later, the debate about the proper role of the
courts in wartime was renewed in the context of various executive and
legislative orders and enactments that, inter alia, required JapaneseAmericans living on the west coast to report to relocation centers, and later,
resulted in the physical relocation of large numbers of Japanese-Americans
99
to internment camps. Fred Korematsu, a Japanese-American living in

95. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 2 ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: COMPLETE WORK 55 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., New York, Century Co. 1894); see
also Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1839, 1867 n.107 (2010).
96. To be sure, it is not uncontroversial to suggest that Taney’s position in Merryman represents
support for the rule of law through protection of individual rights. See, e.g., Jerrica A. Giles & Allen C.
Guelzo, Colonel Utley’s Emancipation—Or, How Lincoln Offered to Buy a Slave, 3 MARQ. L. REV.
1263, 1279 (2010) (suggesting that Taney’s opinion in Ex Parte Merryman constituted an effort “to
obstruct the Union war effort” and was grounded in his continuing support of slavery); see also Emily
Calhoun, The Accounting: Habeas Corpus and Enemy Combatants, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 136 n.275
(2008) (“It is worth noting that Ex Parte Merryman as written by Justice Taney, himself responsible for
endorsing a deprivation of liberty in Dred Scott . . . .”). However, when separated from his most
famous decision or to the extent that the two cases can be reconciled, Taney’s opinion in Merryman
suggests that he viewed suspension of the writ as a simple matter of liberty—that the government could
not detain a citizen without permitting him an opportunity to challenge his detention. Timothy S.
Huebner, Lincoln Versus Taney: Liberty, Power, and the Clash of the Constitutional Titans, 3 ALB.
GOV’T L. REV. 615, 638−39 (2010). Huebner offers the following explanation as a potential
reconciliation of Chief justice Taney’s decisions in Merryman and Dred Scott:
[T]he connection between Dred Scott and Merryman was that, in both instances, Taney
[sought to] protect individual rights from the supposedly oppressive acts of the central
government. From a modern perspective, of course, the notion of slaveholders possessing the
right to own other human beings is both ludicrous and repulsive. But viewed in the context of
nineteenth century constitutional thought, Taney’s decisions in the two cases were of a piece.
The Chief Justice saw protecting the rights of slaveholders from hostile congressional
legislation as just as important as protecting the rights of Confederate sympathizers from
unlawful arrest and detention.
Id.
97. Id. at 639; see also Ackerman, supra note 86, at 482 (“It was [Lincoln’s] insistence on saving
the Union, at whatever the cost, that led him to suspend constitutional rights against arbitrary arrest and
detention.”).
98. REHNQUIST, supra note 86, at 39.
99. Id. at 192–93.
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California, was convicted of violating these exclusion orders. Korematsu
challenged his conviction and the “draconian” relocation and internment
requirement in federal court, eventually appealing the case to the United
101
102
In Korematsu v. United States, a majority of
States Supreme Court.
the Court upheld the relocation and internment policy, deferring, with little
103
Although
question, to the military judgment of the political branches.
the Court acknowledged the “hardships imposed by [the order] upon a large
group of American citizens,” it nonetheless concluded that because
“hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships,” the
104
The
relocation and internment orders were constitutionally permissible.
105
majority’s opinion in Korematsu has been widely condemned, but never
explicitly overturned. Three justices—Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson—
106
issued staunch dissents.
What is significant, in our view, about the Merryman and Korematsu
cases is that they represent moments in our history in which, due to
ongoing war, the political branches took actions that denied important civil
liberties to certain citizens and non-citizens alike. Chief Justice Taney’s
Merryman opinion may have been of little practical significance, and the
Korematsu majority may have simply gotten it wrong, but at least a judicial
officer—Taney himself in Merryman, the dissenting justices in
Korematsu—commented on the violation, rising to assert the continued
validity of civil liberties, even in times of crisis. While much has been said
about what can be learned from these cases, and the other “wartime cases,”
what they perhaps best represent is the need for constructive judicial
dissent from executive excess in times of national crisis. Of course, such
dissent, particularly in times of national crisis, may require judicial
107
An exercise of this courage in the Kiyemba cases—whether in
courage.
the form of complete appellate review, or at the very least, a dissent from
the Court’s earlier dismissal—might have reminded the lower courts, at the
very least, of their responsibility to adhere to the Constitution, despite
national security pressures.
Although dissenting opinions have little value as legal precedent, they
100. Id. at 193.
101. See id.
102. 323 U.S. 214 (1945).
103. See id. at 217−18.
104. See id. at 219.
105. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 86, at 99 (“While Korematsu itself has not been overruled, it is
widely viewed with shame. Eight of the nine sitting Justices on today’s Supreme Court have stated that
Korematsu was wrongly decided; Justice Antonin Scalia has placed Korematsu on par with Dred
Scott.”); Wood, supra note 85, at 469−70 (noting that “many of the lapses from the rule of law (such as
the Japanese internments [and cases]) are now widely regarded as shameful episodes that should never
be repeated”).
106. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting);
id. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
107. See Wood, supra note 85, at 469–70.
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do put the ideas and core principles they state out into the world, where
they may influence public opinion, future judicial rulings, or even, perhaps
political decisions. The potential to influence public opinion is especially
significant where civil rights of unpopular groups are at stake, whether
those are the rights of Japanese Americans during WWII or persons who
108
are or perceived to be Muslims today. Furthermore, concurring and
dissenting opinions also signal that the Court is not a united front on an
issue, which is valuable at least in terms of determining how much weight
to give to a judicial decision; and afford opportunities for overturning
precedent in the future. Moreover, they signal that careful consideration
ought to be given to a divided court’s position on important issues
involving individual rights, especially in national security cases.
Concurring and dissenting opinions are thus very important in a democratic
109
society.
B. Post-9/11 Jurisprudence
On November 13, 2001, two months after September 11, President
George W. Bush issued a military order authorizing the detention and trial
by military commission of any non-citizen who the President had “reason
to believe” was in any way affiliated with Al Qaeda or terrorism. 110 The
order also prohibited detainees from seeking judicial review of the status
determination made by the President in the courts of the United States or in
111
So began a series of cases and Congressional
international tribunals.
enactments that spoke directly to the role of the courts in times of national
crisis.
Over a four-year period, the Supreme Court, addressing for the first
time the role of the courts in the context of the new War on Terror, made
powerful assertions about that role and about the relationship between the
courts and the political branches in times of war. In the first of a line of
112
significant cases, the Court held in Rasul v. Bush that jurisdiction to
“determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite detention of
[non-citizen] individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing”
lies with the federal courts and that challenges to the legality of such

108. See generally, e.g., COLE, supra note 86; see also Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist,
49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002), which discusses the public and private discrimination directed towards
Muslim and those perceived to be Muslim following September 11.
109. See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003).
110. Military Order of November 13, 2001, §§ 3(a), 4(a), 3 C.F.R. 918, 919−20 (2002), reprinted
in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. V. 2005). See generally Kathleen M. McCarroll, With Liberty and Justice for
All: The November 13, 2001 Military Order Allowing the Use of Military Tribunals to Try Those
Suspected of Aiding Terrorists Violates the Rights Guaranteed to Non-Citizen United States Residents
Under the Constitution, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 231, 233−34 (2003) (detailing the provisions of
President Bush’s November 13, 2001 military order).
111. Military Order of November 13, 2001, § 2(a), 3 C.F.R. at 919.
112. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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detentions are to be presented through petitions for a writ of habeas
113
corpus. The same day that it issued its opinion in Rasul, the Court ruled
114
115
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that detainees are entitled to certain basic due
process guarantees, including “notice of the factual basis for classification,
and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a
116
neutral decisionmaker.”
117
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, finding
118
which
that the recently-enacted Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,
purported to strip the federal judiciary of jurisdiction over the habeas
119
petitions of all Guantanamo Bay detainees, did not apply to detainee
120
Shortly after the
cases pending at the time of the statute’s enactment.
Court decided Hamdan, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of
121
2006, which amended the Detainee Treatment Act to explicitly include
language stripping the courts of jurisdiction over pending cases. The
Military Commissions Act also broadened the scope of the previous act, so
that the restrictions on habeas petitions applied to all enemy combatant
122
cases, whether the detainee was located at Guantanamo Bay, or not. The
constitutionality of the latter statute was presented to the Supreme Court in
123
Boumediene v. Bush, arguably the defining opinion of this period in the
Court’s history, and the Court’s final word—to date—in the ongoing War
124
on Terror.
In Boumediene, the Court held that the petitioners, a group of foreign
nationals designated enemy combatants by the Executive and detained at
125
Guantanamo Bay, are “entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to
113. See id. at 483–85.
114. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
115. The opinion is arguably limited to American citizen detainees. See Bruce Miller, No Virtue
in Passivity: The Supreme Court and Ali Al-Marri, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 697, 726 (2011) (“The
limited resolution offered by . . . Hamdi . . . to the questions raised by executive detention without trial
is . . . narrowed even further by the fact that the detainee[] in [that] case[ was an] American citizen[.] It
is possible that the Justices’ opinion[] . . . [is] largely irrelevant to the fates of hundreds, or perhaps
possibly thousands, of non-citizens held without trial in American military custody at various sites,
known and unknown, around the world.”).
116. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
117. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
118. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1005(e)(1), 119
Stat. 2739 (2005).
119. Id. § 1005(e)(2), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742−43.
120. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 575–84.
121. The Military Commissions Act, U.S.C.A § 2241(e)(7) (Supp. 2007)).
122. Jackman, supra note 79, at 748-49 (citing The Military Commissions Act, supra note 121).
123. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
124. See Megan Gaffney, Boumediene v. Bush: Legal Realism and the War on Terror, 44 HARV.
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 197, 197 (2009) (“With Boumediene, the Court [firmly] asserted its role in the War on
Terror.”).
125. The facts of Boumediene are as follows: Lakhdar Boumediene, an Algerian national, was
picked up, along with five other men, by American forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and transported to
Guantanamo Bay in 2002, where they were classified as enemy combatants based on allegations that
they were involved in terrorist activity. Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Judicial Deference, 92 B.U. L.
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126

challenge the legality of their detention.”
The Court also held that the
procedures for reviewing the status designation of a detainee provided by
Congress in the Detainee Treatment Act were unconstitutional because they
127
did not provide an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus.
Consequently, to the extent that the Military Commission Act operated to
strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over the habeas petitions of
Guantanamo detainees, that statute, the Court held, effected an
128
unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus. Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority, acknowledged the significance of the writ of habeas
corpus, referring to it as a “time-tested device” that is central to the
“delicate balance of governance,” and explaining that such a balance is
129
itself “the surest safeguard of liberty.”
Just as significant as what Boumediene does say, is what it does not.
The case does not address the Executive’s authority to detain the
Guantanamo Bay detainees, nor does it hold that the writ must issue as to
130
these particular detainees. Instead, the case holds only that the detainees
are entitled to access to the writ; the contours of when, if at all, the writ
must issue, or the appropriate remedy for the writ upon issuance are not
addressed. In the Court’s words, “[t]hese and other questions regarding the
legality of the detention,” and presumably, the appropriate remedy if the
detention is found unlawful, “are to be resolved in the first instance” by the
131
trial court.
Thus, in the years immediately following 9/11, the Supreme Court
took deliberate, if uneven, steps in the direction of affirmatively asserting
its role as a guarantor of individual rights in the context of the War on
Terror. However, Boumediene—which was decided more than four years
ago—remains the Court’s last word. In 2010, eight petitions for certiorari
related to the continued detention of various prisoners at Guantanamo Bay
132
The Supreme Court denied
were presented to the Supreme Court.
certiorari as to seven of the eight petitions; the eighth petition was rendered
133
moot. The Supreme Court’s recent silence in this arena is deafening. As
I discuss throughout this article, Kiyemba presented the Court with an
opportunity to break its silence—to make clear rulings on specific remedial
issues related to the habeas rights of the Guantanamo detainees and to
REV. 89, 137 (2012) (noting that U.S. forces picked up these individuals “despite contrary orders from
the highest court [in Bosnia], which had investigated all charges against Boumediene and the others
only to find them baseless”). The detainees remained at Guantanamo until their habeas petitions were
considered by the Supreme Court in 2008. Id.
126. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
127. See id. at 779–94.
128. See id. at 792.
129. Id. at 745.
130. Id. at 733.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 189.

VAUGHNS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

8/12/2013 1:16 PM

26

[Volume 20:7

ASIAN AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL

reassert the judiciary’s ongoing role in securing individual rights in the War
on Terror. The Supreme Court missed this opportunity and others, leaving
much unsaid.
Justice O’Connor’s 2004 plurality opinion in Hamdi offered perhaps
one of the strongest assertions of the continued and undiminished role of
the judiciary in the War on Terror, an assertion that could have been
reaffirmed, and reinvigorated, in Kiyemba.
She rejected “the
Government’s assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a
heavily circumscribed role for the courts” in this context, stating that such
an assertion “serves only to condense power into a single branch of
134
Such concentration of power is contrary to established
government.”
principles, Justice O’Connor states, as the Court has long “made clear that
a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to
135
Indeed, “[w]hatever power the United States
[individual] rights.”
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations
or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at
136
By this metric, Kiyemba represents a tragically missed
stake.”
opportunity. The case also represents a missed opportunity because, in the
wake of Boumediene, the lower federal courts, and particularly the courts
located in the District of Columbia, have tended (with some significant
exceptions) not to delicately balance the competing interests of national
security and civil liberties, but to tip the scales in near-absolute deference
to the government’s security agenda—thus writing the very “blank check”
that Justice O’Connor feared.
In an important 2005 article, distinguished legal scholar Cass Sunstein
137
termed this phenomenon “National Security Fundamentalism.” In the
D.C. Circuit, where the large majority of cases pertaining to the
Guantanamo Bay detainees have been heard, National Security
Fundamentalism is ascendant. Cass Sunstein characterizes the D.C. Court
of Appeals’ approach to these cases as accepting a “highly deferential role
138
for the judiciary” in cases where “national security is threatened.” Under
this approach, “the president must be permitted to do what needs to be done
139
Six
to protect the country,” and the judiciary is, simply, to butt out.
years later, Sunstein’s description of the approach of the D.C. courts to
Guantanamo Bay cases remains on point. Kiyemba I, and its reinstated and
modified counterpart, Kiyemba III, are classic examples of a national

134. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535-36 (emphasis omitted).
135. See id. at 536.
136. Id.
137. Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and the D.C. Circuit, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
693, 693 (2005).
138. Id.
139. See id.
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security fundamentalist approach to a troubling question involving
balancing national security and civil liberties.
C. The Deteriorated Role of the Courts Post-9/11
1. The Unreviewable Executive and the Assertion of Inherent Power
One week after the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Authorization
140
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which authorized the President
“to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
141
The Bush administration “relied on the
such organizations or persons.”
AUMF to argue that the scope of its ‘all necessary and appropriate force’
includes the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists as enemy
combatants,” an approach that has been adopted, arguably, by the Obama
142
Moreover, President Bush’s November 13, 2001
administration.
Military Order “authoriz[ed] the Secretary of Defense to detain any alien
the president determined to be a member of al Qaeda; or who had engaged
in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit international terrorism; or who
143
The Military
had harbored someone who had done any of those acts.”
Order also provided that detainee trials would occur in military tribunals
and denied the detainees “the right to seek recourse in any other tribunal,
144
Ostensibly, the government’s plan
including state and federal courts.”
was to conduct its War on Terror without judicial intervention. The
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Detainee Treatment and Military
Commissions Acts are further evidence of this effort.
Despite the Court’s efforts to ensure that the Guantanamo Bay
detainees be accorded some semblance of procedural and substantive
145
rights, the detainees nonetheless have found themselves in a “legal black
146
The political branches repeatedly denied the detainees their
hole.”
rights. Further, court decisions regarding those rights are slow coming. In
many ways, the Bush administration attempted to create an effectively
“unreviewable Executive,” as evidenced by the administration’s in-court
arguments that the President has the authority to conduct counterterrorism

140. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq.).
141. Id. (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1544).
142. A. Wallace Tashima, The War on Terror and the Rule of Law, 15 ASIAN AM. L.J. 245, 248
(2008).
143. Id. (citing Military Order of November 13, 2001, § 2(a), 3 C.F.R. at 919).
144. Id.
145. See supra Part I.A.1.ii.
146. See generally, e.g., Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 1 (2004); see also Peter Margulies, The Detainees’ Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy
Strategies in the War on Terror, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 352 (2009) (describing Guantanamo Bay as a
“law-free zone”).
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measures without judicial intervention by virtue of his “inherent” war
147
Yet, despite the government’s lack of
powers as “commander-in-chief.”
success in so arguing before the Supreme Court, few, if any, detainees have
been released or transferred from the Guantanamo Bay facility without the
148
government’s express acquiescence.
What are the origins of this approach? In response to the first
attempted terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the Clinton
administration adopted the traditional criminal investigative approach used
by the FBI, followed by widely-covered jury trials held in the criminal
justice system, successful court convictions, and long-term
149
This was, as one commentator has noted, a
incarcerations.
“quintessentially American way of fighting terrorism,” which in the years
150
In the days,
following 9/11, “is becoming a rapidly fading memory.”
weeks, and months following 9/11, the Bush administration argued that the
magnitude of the 9/11 attacks, coupled with the threat of future attacks,
necessarily elevated the previously employed criminal justice paradigm to a
151
Pursuant to the AUMF, President Bush ordered
war paradigm.
American forces into Afghanistan, where U.S. troops remain stationed
147. See, e.g., Jonathan Hafetz, Military Detention in the “War on Terrorism”: Normalizing the
Exceptional After 9/11, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31, 36 (2012); see also U.S. Const. art II, § 2 (the
commander-in-chief clause). The Obama Administration has, it appears, “all-but abandoned one of the
hallmark arguments of the Bush administration—that the President has inherent power under the
Commander-in-Chief clause of Article II to take measures he deems appropriate during wartime, and
that congressional attempts to constrain that authority, to the extent they even apply, are
unconstitutional.” Stephen I. Vladeck, The Unreviewable Executive: Kiyemba, Maqaleh, and the
Obama Administration, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 603, 604 (2010).
148. See Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of Guantanamo Bay, 27 BERK. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–4 (2009)
(describing what she calls “the mystery of Guantanamo Bay”: “How can it be that nearly seven years
after the first detainees arrived at the prison there—after numerous courtroom battles, the most
significant of which resulted in defeats for the Bush Administration’s position—not a single detainee
has ever been released, by order of any court or any other body in a position of authority, against the
wishes of the Administration?”).
149. Nathan Goetting, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012: Battlefield
Earth, 68 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 247, 248 (2011) (“In 1995 Ramzi Yousef, Pakistani national,
jihadist militant, and nephew of future 9/11 planner Khalid Muhammed, was arrested in Islamabad and
extradited to New York where, upon being afforded his constitutional trial rights, the same as any other
criminal defendant, he was convicted by a civilian judge in a federal district court for the 1993 bombing
of the World Trade Center. Since his conviction the U.S. criminal justice system has dealt with him
severely and effectively. He is serving a life sentence in solitary confinement in the so-called ‘Alcatraz
of the Rockies,’ the federal supermax prison in Colorado.”).
150. See id.
151. See President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State
of the Union, 40 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 94, 96 (Jan. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Bush State of the Union]
(“I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all. They view terrorism more as a
crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement and indictments. After the World Trade
Center was first attacked in 1993, some of the guilty were indicted and tried and convicted and sent to
prison. But the matter was not settled. The terrorists were still training and plotting in other nations
and drawing up more ambitious plans. After the chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is not
enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the
United States, and war is what they got.”).
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152

today—the longest war in U.S. history.
Pursuant to the November 2001
Military Order, American troops began capturing, and subsequently
detaining, hundreds of individuals at military camps. Some detainees have
153
One might ask
now been in American custody for more than a decade.
what explains the difference between the two approaches. Arguably, one
approach is in pursuit of a legal avenue for redress; the other permits
Executive-level secrecy. More than three thousand civilians lost their lives
in the 2001 attacks, compared to the six who died in the 1993 bombing
154
The perpetrators of the 2001 attack on the World
eight years earlier.
Trade Center and Pentagon were suicide actors; unlike the perpetrators of
the 1993 bombing, none survived. These significant differences presented
the administration with an opportunity to turn to “the dark side” in meeting
155
the new terrorist threat.
In declaring this a “war on terror,” the Bush administration followed
previous administrations in declaring a policy-oriented war on a particular
156
But no previous administration had taken the
evil—this time, terrorism.
notion of political war to this degree, modifying the war paradigm from
mere rhetoric to actual military conflict, notwithstanding, in many
157
instances, the nation’s Constitution, laws, and treaties. In conducting the
War on Terror, the administration embarked down a slippery slope of
governance in flagrant disregard of individual rights and civil liberties and
without transparency, promising that it was protecting the nation against
future terrorist threats. Under this approach, the nation found itself falling
into the nadir of unfulfilled constitutional guarantees and judicial
oversight—or worse, neglect.
As explained above, this behavior is not wholly surprising for
presidents during wartime or a national emergency. And although it is the
courts’ role to protect individual rights and sanction their infringement, the
Bush administration’s wartime detainee policies remained immune from
judicial scrutiny until 2004. Consequently, it was not until the Supreme
Court’s 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush that the Uighurs gained access to
the courts by habeas review. Due to various legislative actions, that access
152. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
153. Eric Sandberg-Zakian, Beyond Guantanamo: Two Constitutional Objections to Nonmilitary
Preventive Detention, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 491, 492 (2011) (noting the length of some detainees’
military detentions).
154. Roberto Iraola, Enemy Combatants, the Courts, and the Constitution, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 565,
570 n.23 (2003).
155. See generally JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008) (describing how the decisions made post9/11 impacted constitutional rights).
156. See Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1871 (2004) (“The Cold War.
The War on Poverty. The War on Crime. The War on Drugs. The War on Terrorism. Apparently, it
isn’t enough to call a high-priority initiative a High-Priority Initiative. If it’s really important, only a
wimp refuses to call it war.”).
157. See id. at 1902.
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was to be short lived. Only upon issuance of the Boumediene decision did
the Uighurs gain definitive access to the American judicial system. Until
that point, they had been languishing in indefinite detention for nearly six
years. Another year would pass before a federal court ordered their release.
While some of the Uighur detainees were released pursuant to government
agreements, none were released pursuant to court order. If there ever was a
time for the Court to act, to step in, acknowledge, and remedy a basic
injustice, namely, the unlawful and ongoing detention of a group of
individuals that present no threat to the security of the United States, but
were the victims of an excessive executive approach post-9/11, surely that
time was when the Court was presented with Kiyemba III.
Perhaps what is most frustrating about the present situation is that it is
entirely of the government’s own making. It was the government’s rush to
action that resulted in the detention of a number of individuals entirely
unrelated to terrorism. In the Uighurs’ case, the government was aware
early on that they were not terrorists, yet it persisted in treating them as
158
And in its external relocation
such until it finally conceded otherwise.
efforts, the government is now attempting to foist the consequences of its
own follies, forays, and missteps onto other countries, while refusing to
consider internal relocation, which would allow it to claim responsibility
for, and remedy, the wrongs of its own creation.
In 2009, the Obama administration began to pursue fertile avenues for
159
transferring the Uighurs into the continental interior of the United States.
But, “in the face of congressional objections,” largely registered by
Republican critics, reigniting fear-mongering notions about releasing
160
161
These
terrorists into our midst, “the White House lost its nerve.”
concerns, however, are a political matter—and should not influence the
courts, as I describe below. Once a habeas court has determined that
detention is unlawful, political opposition to release locations should not
alter the legal requirement to release them immediately, at the very least, as
162
I have noted, pending the completion of external relocation negotiations.
Any other result undermines Boumediene, undermines the rule of law, and
affords the Executive, in contravention of the separation of powers,
unreviewable discretion to control the detention of individuals captured

158. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
159. Carol Rosenberg, Why Obama Hasn’t Closed Guantanamo Camps, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 7,
2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/07/2578082/why-obama-hasnt-closed-guantanamo.html;
Samuel C. Kauffman, Guantanamo Bay Prison Inmates Cleared for Release Continue to Languish,
OREGONIAN
(Jan.
11,
2012),
http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/01/guantanamo_bay_prison_inmates.html.
160. See Barbara Ferguson, Scattering Begins of Detainees from Gitmo, ARAB NEWS, June 13,
2009. Similar rumblings were made when the Obama administration made efforts to conduct terrorist
trials in the American federal criminal system.
161. Rosenberg, supra note 159.
162. See infra Part IA.
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during the War on Terror—even individuals long-ago found to be innocent
of wrongdoing.
2. The Undermining of the Rule of Law
As history will recall, in May 1977, former President Richard M.
Nixon famously told British interviewer David Frost that “when the
163
The Bush
President does it, that means that it is not illegal.”
administration, taking a page out of Nixon’s playbook, used various tactics,
apparently effectively, to “dismantle constitutional checks and balances and
164
In so doing, the administration took
to circumvent the rule of law.”
advantage of 9/11 to assert “the most staggering view of unlimited
165
presidential power since Nixon’s assertion of imperial prerogatives.”
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Kiyemba III, reinstating as modified its
opinion in Kiyemba I, is, as I have noted, now governing precedent. That
earlier opinion, adopting a view that the government had argued all along,
re-characterizes the law pertaining to detainees at Guantanamo Bay as a
matter of immigration. Immigration is an area of law where the sovereign
prerogative on which an individual is admitted or excluded from entry into
166
The Bush
the United States is virtually immune from judicial review.
administration long ago adopted the position that judicial review of its
detention policies would frustrate its war efforts and its Commander-inChief authority, so that efforts to fit Kiyemba within the immigration
framework worked to the government’s benefit. But, as the Boumediene
Court explained, “the exercise of [the Executive’s Commander-in-Chief]
powers is vindicated, not eroded, when [or if] confirmed” by the
167
judiciary.
In 2007, Ninth Circuit Judge A. Wallace Tashima observed that the
rule of law—touted by the United States throughout the world since the end
of World War II—has been “steadily undermined . . . since we began the
168
“The American legal messenger,” Tashima
so-called ‘War on Terror.’”

163. DAVID FROST, FROST/NIXON: BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE NIXON INTERVIEWS 89 (2007);
Excerpts from Interview with Nixon About Domestic Effects of Indochina War, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
1977, at A16; see generally FROST/NIXON (Universal Pictures 2008).
164. CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007) (describing the Bush Administration’s policies as
creating an “imperial Presidency”).
165. Robin Lindley, The Return of the Imperial Presidency: An Interview with Charlie Savage,
HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 7, 2008), http://hnn.us/node/44951 (quote is taken from Lindley’s preinterview remarks).
166. The first clue is that the Uighurs are referred to by the D.C. Circuit as “aliens,” which is a
term of art found in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Characterizing the Uighurs as aliens places
them in the orbit of immigration law, when in reality, they are foreign nationals not seeking to
immigrate to this country. Rather, they are seeking release as part of the substantive remedy required
for determined unlawful detention.
167. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797.
168. Tashima, supra note 142, at 245.
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notes, “has been regarded throughout the world as a trusted figure of
goodwill, mainly by virtue of close identification with the message borne:
that the rule of law is fundamental to a free, open, and pluralistic society,”
that the United States represents “a government of laws and not of
169
persons,” and that “no one—not even the President—is above the law.”
But, according to Tashima, the actions that the United States has “taken in
the War on Terror, especially [through] our detention policies, have belied
our commitment to the rule of law and caused [a] dramatic shift in world
opinion,” so that the War on Terror has been greeted internationally with
170
Put differently, the United
“increasing skepticism and even hostility.”
States has shot the messenger—and with it, goes the message, the
commitment to the rule of law, and our international credibility.
The primary assassin in this “assault on the role of law” is the
argument “that the President is not bound by law—that he can flout the
Constitution, treaties, and statutes of the United States as Commander-in171
Also wreaking havoc on the rule of law is
Chief during times of war.”
the notion, described above, that the President’s actions in times of war are
unreviewable, and that the judiciary has no role to play in checking
wartime policies—a notion perpetuated by placement of issues like those
raised in Kiyemba within the immigration framework.
How can the Executive take such an approach as its legal defense,
despite swearing, upon inauguration, to “preserve, protect[,] and defend the
172
Constitution of the United States,” and despite constitutional directive
173
As
that he “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”?
distinguished co-authors Charles Fried and Gregory Fried observe, the oath
174
Rather, “the
of office does not mention defending national security.
president’s duty is explicitly to the law, not [to] some vague goal beyond
175
According to these authors, “[t]he law is our defense against
the law.”
tyranny, the arbitrary imposition of one person’s will over all others, and
176
If, as
against anarchy, the ungoverned combat of many people’s wills.”
the Executive has done since 9/11, “we cut down the laws to lay hold of
our enemies,” where are we to “hide when the Devil turns round on us,
177
If a reminder of the oath
armed with the power of the state?”
undertaken, the values underlying it, and the need to engage all three
branches of government in protecting those values were necessary, the
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 246.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
CHARLES FRIED & GREGORY FRIED, BECAUSE IT IS WRONG: TORTURE, PRIVACY AND
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE AGE OF TERROR 152 (2010).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 129.
177. Id.
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Executive would need to look no further than the pages of the Supreme
Court Reporter.
178
for example, the Supreme Court stated that
In Ex Parte Milligan,
the Constitution “is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
179
Central to this protection is the
times, and under all circumstances.”
separation of powers, by which one branch of government is not permitted
to go unchecked. Indeed, as Justice O’Connor stated in the Hamdi case,
“[w]hatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations
in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches
180
And even the Executive’s war
when individual liberties are at stake.”
power “does not remove constitutional limitations,” including the
181
separation of powers, “safeguarding essential liberties.”
According to the Milligan Court, the founding fathers “knew—the
history of the world told them—the nation they were founding, be its
182
How frequently or
existence short or long, would be involved in war.”
183
of what length, “human foresight could not tell.” But, the founders knew
that “unlimited power, wherever lodged at such a time, was especially
184
For this reason, “they secured the inheritance
hazardous to freemen.”
they had fought to maintain, by incorporating in a written constitution the
185
safeguards which time had proved were essential to its preservation.”
These safeguards cannot be disturbed by any one branch, unless the
186
Constitution so provides—and with the checks authorized therein.
Indeed, “[t]o hold [that] the political branches have the power to switch the
Constitution on or off at will . . . would permit a striking anomaly in our
tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in which Congress and
187
And “our basic
the President, not [the courts], say ‘what the law is.’”
188
To the extent that it has
charter cannot be contracted away like this.”
been—through executive action, paired with judicial inaction—the rule of
law is undermined. We can and we must do better. The Constitution, and
those who drafted it, would demand so.
178. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
179. Id. at 120-21.
180. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.
181. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934); see also Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“[It was] the central judgment of the Framers . . . that, within
our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential
to the preservation of liberty.”).
182. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 125.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. (emphasis omitted).
186. See id.
187. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
188. Id.

VAUGHNS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

8/12/2013 1:16 PM

34

[Volume 20:7

ASIAN AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL

By reconsidering the opportunities presented, and missed, by the
Kiyemba v. Obama case, we might see ways that we could do better, ways
that we could restore the rule of law to its rightful place in our system of
government and in that government’s policy choices.
III.

RE-CONSIDERING KIYEMBA V. OBAMA: THE ILLEGALITY OF
INDEFINITE DETENTION, THE INAPPLICABILITY OF
IMMIGRATION LAW, AND CHECKING THE UNCHECKED
EXECUTIVE

A. The Illegality of Indefinite Detention and the Remedy Requirement
The writ of habeas corpus, “derived from the Latin meaning ‘you have
the body’” and incorporated into American law from the British common
law, safeguards individual liberty “by affording people seized by the
government the right to question the grounds for their detention before a
189
The writ does more than “protect the freedom of the individual
judge.”
190
It also represents “an important structural
from unlawful restraint.”
function in our constitutional system,” ensuring “checks and balances
191
among the branches” and “adherence to the rule of law.” Put simply, the
writ protects against indefinite and unchecked detention.
While the scope of the writ and its continued viability remain the
subject of significant debate, most scholars and jurists agree that the
Suspension Clause, the writ’s constitutional enshrinement, “protects the
192
But as distinguished legal scholar Stephen
writ ‘as it existed in 1789.’”
Vladeck notes in a 2011 book review, however, “that limited point of
consensus begs a separate question: what was the scope of the writ” at the
193
While jurists and scholars have reached differing
time of the founding?
conclusions on that point, evidence suggests that habeas, as understood by
the framers, included a guarantee of relief. Such evidence indicates that the
habeas remedy, as much as access to the writ itself, is an essential part of
194
the constitutional guarantee. Moreover, the early framers viewed habeas
189. Jonathan Hafetz, A Different View of the Law: Habeas Corpus During the Lincoln and Bush
Presidencies, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 439, 439–40 (2009). Following its common law incorporation, the writ
was enshrined in the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”
U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 9, cl. 2.
190. Hafetz, supra note 189, at 400.
191. Id.
192. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); Stephen I. Vladeck, Book Review, The New
Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 942 (2011) (reviewing PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS
CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (Harv. Univ. Press 2010)).
193. Vladeck, supra note 192, at 942.
194. See generally Brief of Scholars of Nineteenth-Century American Legal History as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1498 (2008) (arguing that United States
v. Libellants & Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841) provides early American
precedent for the release of the Uighurs into the United States); Brief of Retired Federal Judges as
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195

as “an essential check on executive power,” and the ultimate guarantor of
individual liberties. Alexander Hamilton, quoting Blackstone, referred to
habeas as “the bulwark of our liberties,” and, like others, thought habeas to
be “such a powerful check on tyranny that a separate Bill of Rights was
196
Indeed, as Justice Salmon Chase noted in 1868, almost
unnecessary.”
one hundred years after the founding, “The great writ of habeas corpus has
been for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal
197
It has been, stated differently, the most esteemed of
freedom.”
constitutional rights. It would make little sense, in view of this long
history, for the right to come unaccompanied by a meaningful remedy.
The dissent in Hamdi drives this point home. According to Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, nothing short of bringing criminal
charges (if sufficient evidence warranted such charges) would permit an
198
Without
American citizen’s continued detention at Guantanamo Bay.
such charges, an unqualified release from indefinite detention was
199
Because the Constitution speaks of “persons” and not
necessary.
“citizens” in the Bill of Rights, the same is, likely, true for noncitizens
cleared of all terrorist-related activity, such as the Uighurs. But, since
Hamdi, the Supreme Court has not again considered the appropriate
200
Rather, the D.C. Circuit’s
remedy for a successful habeas petitioner.
opinion in Kiyemba I as modified on remand, remains the final word on the
matter. Because that court mischaracterized Kiyemba as an immigration
case, as I explain below, rather than a case involving the habeas right and
its corresponding remedy, the enduring nature of the writ remains up in the
air.
The habeas right’s jurisprudential pedigree is outstanding: indeed, its
201
The
origins are firmly planted in the thirteenth century’s Magna Carta.
plenary power doctrine—the immigration doctrine on which the D.C.
Circuit’s opinion rests, on grounds arguably based in national security
202
203
fundamentalism —is a judicial creation of the late nineteenth century.
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 13, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1498 (arguing that “release
from unlawful Executive detention” is the only remedy “that is faithful to the Framers’ separation-ofpowers scheme and fulfills the fundamental promise of habeas”).
195. Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the Suspension
Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1369 (2010).
196. Redish & McNamara, supra, note 195, at 1369–70 (citing The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
197. Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868).
198. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
199. See id.
200. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 39 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The
Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement regarding Guantanamo detainees assured them certain
procedural guarantees, but hedged when discussing remedy.”). Hamdi was, of course, decided prior to
Boumediene.
201. Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 Yale L.J. 600, 691–92 (2009).
202. The commitment to application of the plenary power doctrine permits the political branches
virtual carte blanche over detainees, as immigration matters are largely immune from judicial review.
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It should not trump rights long embedded in our constitutional history.
B. The Inapplicability of Immigration Law
Distinguished immigration law professor Stephen Legomsky once
204
The oddity began
wrote, “[i]mmigration law is a constitutional oddity.”
in the late nineteenth century, when the Supreme Court handed down a pair
of cases declaring that Congress possesses a “plenary power” to regulate
immigration law—to exclude and expel those immigrants who seek
admission (or are admitted) into the United States, whether temporarily or
as permanent residents. These foundational cases are Ping v. United States,
205
commonly known as The Chinese Exclusion Case, and Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, which could properly be called The Chinese Expulsion
206
In the former case, which involved the exclusion of a returning
Case.
permanent resident under certain statutory enactments, the Supreme Court
207
In the latter case, the Supreme
established the plenary power doctrine.
208
Court extended the plenary power doctrine to deportation proceedings.
Scholars have long considered both cases shameful precedents sanctioning
209
legislation explicitly based on racial grounds.
Ping involved a returning Chinese national seeking readmission into
210
Ping had resided in the United States prior to his trip
the United States.
to China to visit family and friends, and had obtained the requisite
211
However, as Ping was en
certificate to return to his lawful residence.
route back to the United States, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion
Act, barring the admission of racially ethnic Chinese individuals into the
212
Ting involved the deportation of a resident
continental United States.
Chinese national who did not have a certificate of lawful presence signed

For a case illustrating this immunity, see Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320
(1909).
203. See Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
204. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power,
1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984); see Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84
COL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (“Probably no other area of American law has been so radically insulated and
divergent from those fundamental norms of constitutional right, and judicial role that animate the rest of
our legal system.”).
205. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
206. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
207. Ping, 130 U.S. at 600-11.
208. Ting, 149 U.S. at 711-14.
209. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 305 (2d ed. 1996);
Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?: Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection,
and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 503 (2001); Franciso Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical
Pedagogy, and Social Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J. 65, 65
(2003).
210. Ping, 130 U.S. at 581.
211. Id. at 581–82.
212. Id. at 589–90.
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213

by a white witness.
Endorsing the racially-motivated legislation in both
cases, the Court attributed the source of the federal power of immigration
to international law—specifically, to the notion of a sovereign prerogative
214
exercised in the national interest.
Indeed, in another significant immigration case, Ekiu v. United
215
States, the Court declared it an accepted maxim of international law that
“every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions
216
Pursuant to this maxim, the Court
as it may see fit to prescribe.”
217
reaffirmed the plenary power doctrine.
Under that doctrine, the political branches’ authority to exercise power
over immigration matters is considered absolute as a matter of substantive
policy choices regarding who may enter, and remain within the continental
218
United States —notwithstanding the fact that no express authority to
regulate immigration exists within any of Congress’s constitutionally
219
The doctrine, however, is subject to some
enumerated powers.
220
Indeed, where the legislative reach extends in
constitutional limitations.
some meaningful way beyond admission, entry, exclusion, or deportation,
the full panoply of constitutional rights may be triggered. In Yamataya v.
221
Fisher, for example, the Court observed that “administrative officers,
when executing the provisions of a[n immigration] statute involving the
213. Ting, 149 U.S. at 698. For more on this line of cases and the cultural atmosphere in which
both the statutes and the cases were enacted and handed down, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY AND
CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE LAW & POLICY 119 (5th ed. 2009) (citing FRANK
F. CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE 3–4 (1976)).
214. See id. at 119–20.
215. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
216. Id. at 659.
217. Id. at 651-64 (citing to Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581, 604-609 (1889)); see also Fong Yue
Ting, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); cf. Janel Thamkul, The Plenary Power-Shaped Hole in the Core
Constitutional Law Curriculum: Exclusion, Unequal Protection, and American National Identity, 96
CALIF. L. REV. 553, 555 (2008) (indicating that Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting are the two key
constitutional cases establishing the plenary power doctrine in immigration law.).
218. Cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218–28 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (drawing a distinction between substantive and procedural due process, and noting that the
former is more susceptible to political whims, while the later must be fiercely guarded by the judiciary);
id. at 218-24 (“Substantively, due process of law renders what is due to a strong state as well as to a free
individual. It tolerates all reasonable measures to insure the national safety, and it leaves a large, at
times a potentially dangerous, latitude for executive judgment as to policies and means. . . . Procedural
fairness, if not all that originally was meant by due process of law, is at least what it most
uncompromisingly requires. Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible than substantive
due process. It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and defers much less to legislative
judgment. Insofar as it is technical law, it must be a specialized responsibility within the competence of
the judiciary on which they do not bend before political branches of the Government, as they should on
matters of policy which compromise substantive law.”).
219. LEGOMSKY, supra note 213, at 115–16.
220. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
221. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
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liberty of persons,” whether or not those persons entered the country
lawfully, may not “disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due
process of law’ as understood at the time of the adoption of the
222
Similarly, in Wong Wing v. United States, the Court
Constitution.”
invalidated a provision in the Chinese Exclusion Act that imprisoned
Chinese persons found to be unlawfully present in the United States and
punished with hard labor or deportation, explaining that the legislation
223
exceeded matters within the purview of immigration.
In these cases, constitutional guarantees trumped the plenary power
doctrine. Put differently, in Yamataya and Wong Wing, the Supreme Court
found that Congress had overstepped the boundary of authority created by
the plenary power doctrine, and veered into an area of substantive and
procedural constitutional rights. Kiyemba presents a similar case. As the
first judge to hear the Uighurs’ claims noted, the fundamental sovereign
right to exclude or expel aliens from the interior of the United States “does
not mean that the third branch is frozen in place,” unable to step in where
224
Rather, the branches should be guided
constitutional rights are at stake.
by “the principle that personal liberty is secured by adherence to separation
225
of powers.”
The district judge presiding over the Uighurs’ petitions was prepared
to order their release, pending a hearing on the precise contours of that
release. The release remedy certainly would have been conditional, as the
Uighurs would have no immigration status. As a statutory matter,
however, release would have been possible under the Executive’s parole
226
power. The Immigration and Nationality Act gives the Executive the
authority to exercise the parole power when a significant public interest or
227
Both factors are present in
urgent humanitarian concern is implicated.
the Uighurs’ case. First, a strong argument can be made that the Uighurs’
situation presents a significant public interest: Their continued detention
has been judicially declared unlawful. Consistent with adherence to the
rule of law, they should have been released as soon as judicially228
Second, as for the urgency of
determined conditions were established.
222. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100.
223. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237-38_(1896).
224. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 42 n.5 (D.D.C. 2008).
225. Id. at 42 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
226. Pub. L. 89-236 (1965) [hereinafter INA].
227. Id. § 212(d)(5)(A).
228. See, e.g., Brian R. Farrell, Access to Habeas Corpus: A Human Rights Analysis of U.S.
Practices in the War on Terrorism, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 6 (2011) (“By providing
this judicial check on executive authority, habeas corpus ensures compliance with the rule of law.”);
Douglass Cassel, Liberty, Judicial Review, and the Rule of Law at Guantanamo: A Battle Half Won, 43
NEW ENG. L. REV. 37, 37 (2008) (describing the Boumediene decision as one in which the Court
“defended individual liberty, judicial review . . ., and ultimately the rule of law”); Emily Calhoun, The
Accounting: Habeas Corpus and Enemy Combatants, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 136 (2008) (“[T]he
Great Writ gives the judicial branch of government a crucial rule-of-law function.”).
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the humanitarian concern, it was the Executive’s action in prosecuting its
“War on Terror” that created this situation—not the conduct of the
Uighurs. Moreover, the duration of their detention, particularly in light of
the fact that they are not now nor were they ever really enemy combatants,
adds urgency to the humanitarian concern. Thus, an Executive grant of
parole would have been a viable option in this case, if the Executive was
ever serious about facilitating the Uighurs’ release through the immigration
law mechanism.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated previously that an individual
paroled into the United States is not considered to have been admitted or
229
As such, the D.C. Circuit’s rationale about a
gained immigration status.
judge’s inability to accord them immigration status simply does not figure
into a judicially-ordered release remedy. In any event, though assignment
of an immigration status is not required to facilitate the Uighurs’ release,
the fact is that, in Boumediene, the Supreme Court determined that the
Guantanamo Bay naval base is, as a functional matter, a part of the
sovereign territory of the United States, such that the Suspension Clause
230
Because Guantanamo Bay, the site of the Uighurs’
must run there.
detention, has been deemed a part of the territory of the United States, the
proverbial ship, to wit, the idea that the Uighurs’ release involves
“admission” into U.S. territory, has already sailed.
C. The Release Remedy
The Kiyemba litigation is about the need for an appropriate habeas
remedy. As such, immigration law does not prohibit the courts from
ordering release into the interior of the United States as a constitutionally
required remedy for unlawful detention. And because this is a habeas
matter and not a case about aliens seeking admission, an order releasing
these petitioners into the interior of the United States does not invade the
sovereign prerogative of the political branches of government to make
admission decisions pursuant to this country’s immigration laws. Yet, even
in immigration cases, the Supreme Court has recognized the right—at least
as a statutory matter, grounded in constitutional concerns—of noncitizens
who are indefinitely detained to be released conditionally. For example, in
231
and Clark v. Martinez, 232 two cases that are,
Zadvydas v. Davis
admittedly, not strictly analogous to the Uighurs’ case, the Supreme Court
229. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
230. In so doing, the Court rejected the geographic formalism of Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763 (1950). See Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 235 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that after balancing
the factors articulated in Boumediene, American courts had jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions of
detainees held at the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan). But see Al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that habeas jurisdiction did not run to Bagram under the factors stated in
Boumediene).
231. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
232. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).

VAUGHNS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

8/12/2013 1:16 PM

40

[Volume 20:7

ASIAN AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL

found no congressional intent in the governing immigration statute to
detain noncitizens indefinitely, including those who are treated, for various
reasons, as not having made entry under immigration law.
In Zadvydas, the Court found that lawful permanent residents who had
been ordered deported, but lacked any place to relocate, could not be
233
Although the
detained indefinitely following their removal proceedings.
Court’s decision in this case was based on statutory grounds, the Court
nonetheless recognized that the immigration power was subject to
234
In Martinez, the Court extended its ruling in
constitutional constraints.
Zadvydas, which was decided on statutory interpretation grounds, to Cuban
immigrants, who through the entry fiction and despite their physical
presence in the interior of the United States, are without constitutional
rights whatsoever. In each case, the Court interpreted the governing statute
as only authorizing the government to detain noncitizens for a
presumptively reasonable period; once removal from this country to
another location is no longer “reasonably foreseeable,” the continued
detention of the noncitizens is no longer permissible, and the government
235
must conditionally release them.
As for Kiyemba, in the district court, the government asserted that the
Executive may detain individuals pursuant to its inherent “wind-up”
authority, the purported authority to detain individuals associated with a
236
It
conflict for some period of time following the end of that conflict.
237
then argued that Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei “provides a
better read on the constitutional limits to detention than either Zadvydas or
238
Mezei is a case that involved “an alien immigrant permanently
Clark.”
excluded from the United States on security grounds but stranded in his
temporary haven on Ellis Island because other countries [would] not take
239
The district court, reviewing the Uighurs’ petitions, found
him back.”
several very important distinctions between Mezei and the petitions before
the court: First, Mezei was an immigration case; Kiyemba is not. Unlike in
Mezei, the Uighurs are not seeking immigrant admission to the United

233. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (“In our view, the statute, read in light of the Constitution’s
demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring
about that alien’s removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention [after removal
proceedings are complete].”).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 700–01 (observing that the court believed that Congress doubted the constitutionality of
detention that lasted longer than six months.). It is worth noting that, in the context of the Guantanamo
Bay detainees, Boumediene guaranteed the detainees “some form of ‘conditional release’ if [it is found
that] there is no basis for their detention.” Arandes, supra note 7, at 1081 (citing Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008)).
236. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2008).
237. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
238. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
239. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 207.
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240

States. Second, in Mezei, the lower court was not aware of the evidence
against the petitioner’s admission because it was confidential and
undisclosed; in the case of the Uighurs, the government presented evidence
241
supposedly “justifying” their detention, but “failed to meet its burden.”
Consequently, the court concluded—”[d]rawing from the principles
espoused in the Clark and Zadvydas cases and from the Executive’s
authority as Commander in Chief”—that the asserted constitutional
authority to “wind up” matters administratively prior to release had
242
ceased. I agree.
243
the D.C.
Relying on Mezei, and largely ignoring Boumediene,
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court lacked the requisite
authority to order the government to admit the Uighurs into the continental
United States. In so doing, the court refused to appreciate a key distinction:
The habeas court would not be ordering the admission of the Uighurs into
the United States under immigration law. Rather, their release is mandated
by the constitutional guarantee of habeas relief, particularly as the Uighurs’
244
plight was in no way of their own making. In light of the foregoing, it is
clear that, until the Supreme Court explicitly rules on the constitutional
remedy available to such detainees (as distinguished from the right to
challenge the lawfulness of their detention, which was established by
Boumediene), the D.C. Circuit will continue to misguidedly apply
immigration law to an issue plainly outside of its purview, with the effect
of granting nearly unreviewable discretion to the Executive and therefore,
leaving the Uighurs indefinitely and unlawfully detained at Guantanamo
Bay until the Executive is able to secure a relocation destination.
As stated in the Uighurs’ certiorari petition, as a constitutional matter,
“the President’s discretionary release of a prisoner is no different from his
245
To
discretionary imprisonment: each proceeds from unchecked power.”
240. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (“[T]he Mezei petitioner,
unlike the [Uighurs], came voluntarily to the United States, seeking admission.” (citing Mezei, 345 U.S.
at 208)).
241. Id. (stating that the evidence was presented pursuant to the Detainee Treatment Act).
242. Id. at 38-39.
243. Concurring in the judgment, Judge Rogers found the majority’s analysis to be “not faithful to
Boumediene.” Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1032 (Rogers, J., concurring). The majority’s analysis, Judge
Rogers continues, “compromises both the Great Writ as a check on arbitrary detention, effectively
suspending the writ contrary to the Suspension Clause . . . , and the balance of powers regarding
exclusion and admission and release of aliens into the country. . . to reside in the Congress, the
Executive, and the habeas court.” Id.
244. The government had expressed concerns, during briefings, that releasing the Uighurs into the
United States might mean that foreign enemies would dump “volunteers” on our doorstep, knowing that
they could eventually be released into the United States. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Kiyemba,
130 S. Ct. 458 (No. 08-1234). That concern should have no sway in the Uighurs’ case however: The
Uighurs were present at Guantanamo solely as a result of the government’s post-9/11 tactics, as
described above. Mezei does not hold, as the government wishes, that it can be shielded from problems
of its own making.
245. Id. at 34-35.
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view the question of release as based on sovereign prerogative in the
administration of immigration law, while viewing the question of
imprisonment as based on constitutional authority is, put simply, senseless
and without precedent. It cannot be that the two inquiries are unrelated;
they both undoubtedly implicate individual constitutional rights and the
separation of powers. Having refused to resolve this matter, the Supreme
Court has left the separation of powers out of balance and tilting
dangerously toward unilateralism.
D. The Unchecked Executive: The Politics of Judicial Abstention
After being reversed three times in a row in Rasul, Hamdan, and then
Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit finally managed in Kiyemba to reassert, and
have effectively sanctioned, its highly deferential stance towards the
Executive in cases involving national security. In particular, the D.C.
Circuit concluded that an order mandating the Uighurs’ release into the
continental United States would impermissibly interfere with the political
branches’ exclusive authority over immigration matters. But this reasoning
is legal ground that the Supreme Court has already implicitly—and another
three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit more explicitly—covered earlier. As
such, the Bush administration’s strategy in employing the “war” paradigm
at all costs and without any judicial intervention, while unsuccessful in the
Supreme Court, has finally paid off in troubling, and binding, fashion in the
D.C. Court of Appeals, where, national security fundamentalism reigns
supreme and the Executive’s powers as “Commander-in-Chief” can be
exercised with little, if any, real check; arguably leading to judicial
abstention in cases involving national security.
The consequences of the Kiyemba decision potentially continue today,
for example, with passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of
246
2012, which President Obama signed, with reservations, into law on
247
This defense authorization bill contains detainee
December 31, 2011.
provisions that civil liberties groups and human rights advocates have
248
The bill’s supporters strenuously objected to the
strongly opposed.
assertion that these provisions authorize the indefinite detention of U.S.
249
citizens. In signing the bill, President Obama later issued a statement to
246. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. (2011).
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1540enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr1540enr.pdf.
247. David Nakamura, Obama Signs Defense Bill, Pledges to Maintain Legal Rights of U.S.
Citizens, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-signs-defensebill-pledges-to-maintain-legal-rights-of-terror-suspects/2011/12/31/gIQATzbkSP_story.html.
248. See, e.g., Indefinite Detention, Endless Worldwide War and the 2012 National Defense
Authorization Act, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/indefinitedetention-endless-worldwide-war-and-2012-national-defense-authorization-act.
249. See, e.g., Felicia Sonmez & Joby Warrick, Congress Sends Defense Bill to Obama After
POST
(Dec.
15,
2011),
Reworking
Detainee
Provisions,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congress-sends-defense-bill-to-obama-after-reworking-
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the effect that although he had reservations about some of the provisions,
250
Of course, that does
he “vowed to use discretion when applying” them.
not mean another administration would do the same, especially if courts
abstain from their role as protectors of individual rights.
In the years after 9/11, the Supreme Court asserted its role
incrementally, slowly entering into the debate about the rights of enemy
251
combatant detainees. This was a “somewhat novel role” for the Court.
Unsurprisingly, in so doing, the Court’s intervention “strengthened
detainee rights, enlarged the role of the judiciary, and rebuked broad
252
Also unsurprisingly, the Court’s
assertions of executive power.”
decisions in this arena “prompted strong reactions from the other two
253
This may be so because, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted,
branches.”
the Court had, in the past, recognized the primacy of liberty interests only
in quieter times, after national emergencies had terminated or perhaps
254
However, since the twentieth century, wartime
before they ever began.
255
If perpetual war is the new
has been the “normal state of affairs.”
“normal,” the political branches likely will be in a permanent state of alert.
Thus, it remains for the courts to exercise vigilance and courage about
protecting individual rights, even if these assertions of judicial authority
256
But courts,
come as a surprise to the political branches of government.
like any other institution, are susceptible to being swayed by influences
external to the law. Joseph Margulies and Hope Metcalf make this very
point in a 2011 article, noting that much of the post-9/11 scholarship
mirrors this country’s early wartime cases and “envisions a country that
veers off course at the onset of a military emergency but gradually steers
back to a peacetime norm once the threat recedes, via primarily legal
257
This model, they state, “cannot explain a sudden return
interventions.”
to the repressive wilderness just at the moment when it seemed the country
258
had recovered its moral bearings.” Kiyemba is very much a return to the
repressive wilderness.
In thinking about the practical and political considerations that
inevitably play a role in judicial decisionmaking (or non-decisionmaking,
as the case may be), I note that the Court tends to be reluctant to decide
detainee-provisions/2011/12/15/gIQAh1vhwO_story.html.
250. Nakamura, supra note 247. Obama further stated that his Administration would “not
authorize the indefinite military detention without trial of American citizens.” Id.
251. Josh Benson, Comment, The Guantánamo Game: A Public choice Perspective on Judicial
Review in Wartime, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1219, 1219 (2009).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. REHNQUIST, supra note 86, at 15.
255. Dudziak, supra note 83, at 1698 n.173.
256. See generally Wood, supra note 85.
257. Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433, 456
(2011).
258. Id.
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constitutional cases if it can avoid doing so, as it did in Kiyemba.
Arguably, this doctrine of judicial abstention is tied to concerns of
institutional viability, in the form of public perception, and to concerns
259
But, as Justice Douglas once
about respecting the separation of powers.
famously noted, when considering the separation of powers, the Court
should be mindful of Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition that “it is a
260
Consequently, “[i]t is far more
constitution we are expounding.”
important [for the Court] to be respectful to the Constitution than to a
261
And while brave jurists have made
coordinate branch of government.”
such assertions throughout the Court’s history, the Court is not without
some pessimism about its ability to effectively protect civil liberties in
wartimes or national emergencies. For example, in Korematsu—one of the
worst examples of judicial deference in times of crisis—Justice Jackson
dissented, but he did so “with explicit resignation about judicial
powerlessness,” and concern that it was widely believed that “civilian
courts, up to and including his own Supreme Court, perhaps should abstain
from attempting to hold military commanders to constitutional limits in
262
Significantly, even when faced with the belief that the effort
wartime.”
may be futile, Justice Jackson dissented. As I describe in the following
section, that dissent serves a valuable purpose. But, for the moment, I must
consider the external influences on the court that resulted in that feeling of
judicial futility.
In the Kiyemba case, the influences of both politics and public
perception dominated. For example, the government’s relocation efforts
could be construed as an effort to remove the case from the Court’s grasp—
263
resolving the Uighurs’ plight, without necessitating judicial review.
Through its “delay-then-moot strategy,” the Executive controlled the
Court’s ability to determine a significant constitutional issue—the
appropriate remedy for a habeas violation—by eliminating the Court’s
264
The motivation for this strategy remains
power to review the case.
259. See Patrick R. Hugg, Federalism’s Full Circle, 35 LOY. L. REV. 13, 61 n.284 (1989) (“One
justification for abstention is that it will limit perceptions [of intrusion and] protect the Court from
hostile public reaction.”).
260. Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 894 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
261. See id. at 894 n.3 (citing G. HAUSNER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE COURTS OF ISRAEL 228
(1958)).
262. John Q. Barrett, A Commander’s Power, a Civilian’s Reason: Justice Jackson’s Korematsu
Dissent, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57–58 (2005). See generally Robert Jackson, Wartime Security
& Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (1951) (discussing the balance of liberty and security in
times of national crisis).
263. Feb. 19, 2010 Willett Letter, supra note 4, at 3-4 (describing what Willett refers to as the
Executive’s “repeated efforts to avoid review in detention cases,” noting that the “delay-then-moot
strategy” has not been confined to the Uighurs, and citing Rasul v. Bush and Padilla v. Hanft as
examples of similar cases).
264. See id.at 4 (stating that the government’s relocation “efforts have been timed for the eleventh
hour, in order to avoid [the Supreme] Court’s review of an important principle governing all of the
[Gitmo] detention cases”).
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uncertain. It is tied perhaps, at least in the Obama administration, to the
congressional grilling received by former Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates on the possibility of transferring the Uighurs into the interior of the
265
In the face of widespread objection and fear mongering,
United States.
the Obama administration ultimately bowed to congressional pressure, and
terminated efforts to relocate the Uighurs within the continental United
266
States. More significantly, the Executive made these efforts the basis for
its request that the Supreme Court deny continued review in Kiyemba.
IV.

WHAT IS AT STAKE?

The Kiyemba litigation arose in a fascinating context: the War on
Terror, with all of its Executive excess, fear-mongering, and deprivation of
individual rights. But it must be remembered that, at moments in the War
on Terror and before, the courts of this country have risen above politics,
and above fear, to resolutely declare the ongoing vitality of the rule of law.
The Supreme Court itself has done so, most recently in Boumediene v.
Bush. In the years since that decision, holes in the Court’s doctrine have
become apparent; and it is time for the Supreme Court to speak again, and
to clearly articulate the remedy that accompanies the habeas corpus right.
As I describe below, the rule of law remains viable only so long as there
are those who are willing to defend it, to honor it, and to enforce it. A
public reminder that such commitment exists could do much to invigorate
in the public, and one hopes, in the government, a renewed obligation to
the rule of law.
A. The Irrelevance of Boumediene?
Why is the Supreme Court’s refusal to consider Kiyemba of such
significance? It has, as counsel for the Uighurs noted, left the D.C.
Circuit’s Kiyemba I ruling “cemented in place,” and rendered Boumediene
267
Indeed, “[w]ithout further
v. Bush “of little practical relevance.”
enforcement by [the Supreme] Court of Boumediene’s unmistakable
mandate, the D.C. Circuit’s contrary approach will lead to further
protracted delay in the resolution of Guantanamo detainees’ rights and
continued failure by the courts to follow Boumediene’s teaching with
268
This is
regard to extraterritorial application of the Constitution.”

265. See Julian E. Barnes, Gates Backs Plan to Let Detainees In, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at 13.
Gates is not the only official to have been grilled on the possibility of releasing the Uighurs into the
United States. See, e.g., Sara Sorcher, Counterterrorism Nominee Grilled on Guantanamo, NAT’L J.
DAILY, July 27, 2011.
266. Kauffman, supra note 159 (noting the congressional objection to release into the United
States).
267. Feb. 19, 2010 Willett Letter, supra note 4, at 1.
268. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of the Petition for
Certiorari at 23, , Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (Dec. 11, 2009) (No. 08-1234).
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precisely what has happened—if not worse. Review in the D.C. federal
courts, the sole adjudicators of the rights of the Guantanamo Bay
269
detainees, is halted by the uncertainty of the remedy to be provided to a
270
Indeed, some Guantanamo detainees “are
successful habeas petitioner.
denied hearings altogether, as courts conclude that they have no judicial
271
Thus, Guantanamo
remedy power beyond Executive discretion.”
detainees can expect no relief whatsoever other than what the Executive
provides.
So, we return to where we started: with an unchecked Executive and a
judicial branch that knowingly refuses to intervene. Perhaps the Court’s
unwillingness to entertain Kiyemba on the merits signals its desire to no
272
longer be involved in the political debate surrounding the detainees.
Indeed, Boumediene was, arguably, decided only after it became clear that
the Court could no longer avoid the constitutional issue—pressed
previously in Hamdan and Rasul. Thus, with the entry of a new,
theoretically enlightened administration, perhaps the Court was prepared to
bow out gracefully, hoping that the need to bring the judiciary into the
wartime power debate, and consequently jeopardizing its institutional
273
reputation, would be reduced. But, the decision to bow out gracefully
had the very opposite effect—undermining the Court’s credibility and
costing the Court its moral high ground. Recognizing the role that practical
and political factors can potentially influence courts, arguably such external
factors may have guided the Court in its review of the Kiyemba cases. In
any event, the Court refused to “go to bat” when the going got tough.
If courts do not carry out their role as protectors of individual liberty
interests, then it remains for others—including dissenting jurists—to sound
the alarm. In the years leading up to and immediately following
Boumediene, hope for the continued viability of the rule of law remained
strong, as did hope that national security fundamentalism would not be a
mainstay. However, by denying review in Kiyemba, the Supreme Court
has allowed another court to gain the upper hand, dictating outcomes in the
274
As Linda Greenhouse recently noted, since
Guantanamo habeas cases.
269. Christine Waring, Note, The Removal of International Law from Guantanamo Detainee
Litigation: Problems and Implications of Al-Bihani v. Obama, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 927, 956 (2012).
270. Feb. 19, 2010 Willett Letter, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that a post-Kiyemba habeas court
“can only ask the Executive jailer to take ‘necessary and appropriate diplomatic steps’” as a remedy for
unlawful detention, and noting that this so-called “remedy” allows “the Executive to nullify a judicial
[remedy] ruling” entirely).
271. Id. at 4 (citing sealed orders filed separately under seal).
272. Cf., e.g., Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting an instance in
which the court was “spared from having to wade into the debate over whether” due process applies to
noncitizen detainees).
273. After all, these were a series of 5-4 decisions, with a great deal of vitriol from the losing
sides.
274. See Linda Greenhouse, Goodbye to Gitmo, Opinionator Blog, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2012),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/goodbye-to-gitmo/.

VAUGHNS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

8/12/2013 1:16 PM

OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS

47

Boumediene, “the justices have basically permitted the Guantanamo issue
to be outsourced—not, of course, to another country, but to another court, a
few blocks down Constitution Avenue: the United States Court of Appeals
275
There, review “has been anything
for the District of Columbia Circuit.”
276
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit “has been something very
but meaningful.”
277
close to a rubber stamp” for the Executive’s war on terrorism decisions.
Surely, this abdication is troubling, particularly in light of the “institutional
278
pride” displayed by the Court in the years immediately following 9/11.
Greenhouse demands that “the Supreme Court take the rein back into its
own hands, and as Chief Justice John Marshall famously promised, tell us
279
what the law is.” And if not all of the Court—all nine justices, with their
widely ranging views—at the very least, there should have been a justice
willing to vocalize the error of this way. There should have been a dissent.
B. The Need for Dissent
A dissent from the denial of certiorari in either Kiyemba I or Kiyemba
III would have given voice to the observations and concerns about the
meaning of freedom, the appropriate application of the separation of
powers doctrine, and the continuing viability of the rule of law described
above. There is ample authority to support such a dissent, and examples
throughout the Court’s history, even its recent history, that support a
justice’s decision to author a dissent to a denial of certiorari or a dismissal.
Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Mezei provides a model for giving
voice to similar concerns. There, he noted, “it is startling, in this country,
to find a person held indefinitely in executive custody without accusation
280
Indeed, Justice Jackson noted, such
of crime or judicial trial.”
imprisonment “has been considered oppressive and lawless since [King]
John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man should be imprisoned,
disposed, outlawed, or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land,” and the “judges of England developed the writ of habeas
281
corpus largely to preserve these immunities from executive restraint.”
Strongly demanding judicial enforcement of due process, Justice Jackson
stated, “[i]t still is inconceivable to me that this measure of simple justice
282
He
and fair dealing would menace the security of this country.”
concluded with a simple, yet enduringly powerful statement: “No one can

275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
281. Id. at 218–19.
282. See id. at 227–28.
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make me believe that we are that far gone.”
With these words, Justice
Jackson gave voice to the rule of law. And while these words come in a
dissent, they resonate today, more than fifty years later, as clearly as any
portion of the majority’s opinion. Indeed, what was true for Justice
Jackson is true today: We cannot be made to believe that we are so far gone
that individuals, subjected to indefinite and unlawful detention, must
continue to suffer in confinement and may not enjoy the remedy associated
with the relief that they so sought.
Early in the series of cases involving the indefinite detention of
individuals unilaterally labeled “enemy combatants,” the Supreme Court, in
284
dismissed a detainee’s petition on technical
Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
grounds, avoiding the merits raised therein. Justice Stevens authored a
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, in
which he took exception to the Court’s minimization of the issues at stake
285
in the case. Justice Stevens explained:
At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free society.
Even more important than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and
their successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the
Executive by the rule of law. . . . For if this Nation is to remain true to the
ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of tyrants even to
286
resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.

Three years later, the Court denied the initial petition for certiorari
review in Boumediene v. Bush for technical reasons related to the
287
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice
exhaustion of available remedies.
Souter and Justice Ginsburg, filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of
certiorari, stating that they would have granted the petitions for certiorari
288
For Justice Breyer, the issue
and ordered expedited argument.
presented–whether the Military Commissions Act of 2006 deprived the
courts of jurisdiction to consider the detainees’ habeas claims was
289
He
unconstitutional–deserved “the Court’s immediate attention.”
explained: “‘In view of the public importance of the questions raised by
[the Uighurs’] petitions and of the duty which rests on the courts, in time of
war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional
safeguards of civil liberty, . . . we [must] consider and decide [such]
290
As Justice Breyer explained,
questions without any avoidable delay.’”
“the ‘province’ of the Great Writ, ‘shaped to guarantee the most
fundamental of all rights, is to provide an effective and speedy instrument
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at 228.
542 U.S. 426 (2004).
See id. at 455 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 465.
549 U.S. 1328 (2007).
See id. at 1329 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1329–30.
Id. at 1333 (quoting Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942)).
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by which judicial inquiry may be had into the legality of the detention of a
291
person.’” Significantly, he noted:
[P]etitioners have been held for more than five years. They have not
obtained judicial review of their habeas claims. If petitioners are right
about the law, immediate review may avoid an additional year or more of
imprisonment. If they are wrong, our review is nevertheless appropriate
to help establish the boundaries of the constitutional provision of the writ
of habeas corpus. [Moreover,] whether petitioners are right or wrong, our
prompt review will diminish the legal uncertainty that now surrounds the
application to Guantanamo detainees of this fundamental constitutional
292
principle.

Likewise, I assert that the Court should have considered Kiyemba on
the merits. So doing would have avoided the uncertainty surrounding
application of Boumediene to habeas remedies. It also may have avoided
additional months or years of detention for the Uighurs, and would have
allowed the Court to shape the outer contours of the writ of habeas corpus
by defining the writ’s remedial aspect. But, given the Court’s apparent
unwillingness to do so, the very least that was necessary was a dissenting
opinion—a statement acknowledging the import of these issues and giving
voice to concerns about the meaning of freedom, separation of powers, and
the rule of law, particularly as we pass the ten year mark since 9/11.
Without Supreme Court intervention, Guantanamo Bay remains a
legal black hole. Although detainees’ detentions may be judicially deemed
unlawful, the possibility of release from the base without the Executive’s
consent seems almost hopeless. As Muneer Ahmad wrote in a recent
article, Guantanamo has become a place where the remaining detainees
have “no right to have rights,” or at least, if they have rights, they have no
293
Likewise, Lyle Denniston has
right to a remedy for their violation.
recently noted that the Supreme Court, by denying certiorari review in
seven separate detainee appeals, has “confirmed emphatically . . . that it is
not now inclined to further second-guess the government’s detention
294
Not one of these denials was accompanied by a dissent. Thus,
policy.”
the fate of the Guantanamo detainees, including the remaining Uighurs,
rests, as I described above, largely in the hands of the political branches
and the D.C. Circuit.
Linda Greenhouse recently argued that “[t]he fate of the detainees,

291. Id. at 1330 (quoting Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)).
292. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
293. Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantanamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 N.W.
L. REV. 1683, 1687 (2009). Ahmad goes on to argue that, by consistently referring the detainees as
terrorists, and by consistently denying them access to our legal system, the detainees have been largely
dehumanized.
294. Lyle Denniston, Court Bypaasses All New Detainee Cases (Final Update), SCOTUSBLOG
(June 11, 2012, 10:56 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/court-bypasses-all-new-detaineecases/.
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now numbering 169 and in some instances entering a second decade of
confinement, was, after all, never the [Supreme Court’s] principal
295
interest.” Instead, the Court was motivated “primarily [by] a separationof-powers concern”; that concern “fueled the inter-branch drama of 2004 to
2008, during which a shrinking minority, over increasingly sharp dissents,
pushed back against the Bush administration and Congress to assert the
296
The Court’s concern, I believe,
court’s own institutional authority.”
must be both: It must assert the continued viability of the rule of law on
behalf of those whose rights have been violated, and on behalf of the
judiciary, whose ongoing role is essential to maintaining our constitutional
structure. At the very least, a dissent could make this point.
CONCLUSION
As Justice Jackson famously noted, I find it hard to believe that a
person—regardless of citizenship—can be incarcerated in a territory of this
country indefinitely, without charge or without trial; I find it equally hard
to believe that a person can be found unlawfully detained, but remain so.
Yet, this apparently is the way that it is in the aftermath of 9/11,
particularly because the Court has ended its dialogue on the subject of
justice for Guantanamo detainees. The fact that no member of the Court
spoke out in dissent in Kiyemba is unfortunate; the misapplication of
immigration law, resulting in the ongoing detention of some Uighurs is
simply inhumane. Upon a finding that their detention was unlawful,
immediate release was the only appropriate remedy and, indeed, is the
remedy demanded by centuries of English and American law, as well as
basic humanitarian and human rights concerns. Put simply, the two
Uighurs remaining at Guantanamo Bay are entering the second decade of
their detention, despite having been cleared entirely of terrorist affiliation.
This is not the rule of law, nor is it a fact that we should ignore. The writ
of habeas corpus provides a mechanism for resolving this situation. It must
be applied.
While Boumediene v. Bush was heralded as the end of the Bush
297
administration’s failed detention policies, it has not been so for the
Uighurs, and the other detainees, remaining at Guantanamo Bay. With the
Obama administration adopting many of the Bush administration’s policies,
and with the D.C. Circuit rubber stamping those actions, Supreme Court
action is needed. Whether the Uighurs will ever know freedom and
American justice is yet to be determined. So far it has not happened. But
the promise of Boumediene—the promise of our Constitution—demands it.
295. Greenhouse, Goodbye to Gitmo, supra note 274.
296. Id.
297. Supreme Court Restores Rule of Law to Guantanamo—[Boumediene] Decision Represents
Beginning of End of Failed Detention Policy, Says ALCU, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June 12,
2008), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/supreme-court-restores-rule-law-guantanamo.
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And the ultimate responsibility for expounding that Constitution lies with
298
our highest court.
To paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, we have a republic, but only if we
299
can keep it. Review of Kiyemba by the Supreme Court, or in the very
least, a meaningful dissent by a single justice from the denials and
dismissals of review, might have given voice to the importance of the rule
of law in a democratic society, and might have gone a long way toward
keeping the republic we have been given well within our grasp.

298.
299.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
Adam Marinelli, A Call for the Proper Recognition of Habeas Corpus in the 21st Century, 3
CHARLESTON L. REV. 689, 690 (2009) (“On being asked whether the Constitutional Convention had
created a republic or a monarchy, Benjamin Franklin prophetically replied, ‘[a] republic, if you can
keep it.’”) (citing JAMES P. PFIFFNER, POWER PLAY: THE BUSH PRESIDENCY AND THE CONSTITUTION
56 (2008)).

